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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-JUDICIAL REVIEW
Turnbow v. Job Serv. North Dakota
In Turnbow v. Job Serv. North Dakota,1 a building contractor
sued the state job service agency based on its finding that the pay-
ments made to certain workers were wages subject to unemploy-
ment compensation taxes.2 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's decision in favor of the agency.3
Turnbow, a contractor, employed workers during 1986, 1987,
and 1988.' He contended that these workers were independent
contractors and that pursuant to section 52-01-01(17Xe) of the
North Dakota Century Code, payments made to these individuals
were exempt from job insurance taxation.5 Under section 52-01-
01(17Xe) of the North Dakota Century Code, an employer must
pay unemployment taxes on "wages" that are paid to persons
other than independent contractors.6 Turnbow then had the
opportunity to prove that he was exempt from paying unemploy-
ment taxes by establishing all three parts of the "ABC Test" of sec-
tion 5 2 -01-01(17Xe) of the North Dakota Century Code.7 Under
the ABC Test, an employer must prove that: (1) she had no control
over the person's services; (2) the service performed was outside of
the employer's usual course of business; and (3) the person hired
was "engaged in an independently established trade, occupation,
profession, or business."8 The court found that the evidence was
sufficient to support the agency's finding that the first part of the
test was not met because the plaintiff exercised control over the
workers' services.9 Therefore, Turnbow failed to prove that he
was exempt from paying unemployment compensation taxes. 10
In reviewing the agency's decision, the court recognized that
it must only determine whether the agency made a reasonable
determination in light of the evidence in the entire record." The
court determined the agency's findings of fact were "supported by
a preponderance of the evidence" and "its decision [was] sup-
1. 479 N.W. 2d 827 (N.D. 1992).
2. Turnbow v. Job Serv. North Dakota, 479 N.W. 2d 827 (N.D. 1992).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 827.
5. Id. at 830.
6. Id. at 829. Job Service had determined that Turnbow paid wages to the workers and
the court upheld the agency's finding. Id. at 829-30.
7. Turnbow, 479 N.W.2d at 829.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 831. The court noted that since the first part of the test was not met it was not
necessary to review the agency's decision with respect to the third part of the test. Id.
10. Id. at 829.
11. Id. at 828.
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ported by the conclusions of law.' 12
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Little v. Tracy
In Little v. Tracy,13 the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that a new agency regulation on arbitration of an employee's claim
exceeded the scope of the Workers' Compensation Bureau and
was thus invalid.14
In 1991, the North Dakota Legislature made a number of
changes to North Dakota's workers' compensation laws.' 5 The
statutory changes were adopted and became effective as of
November 1, 1991.16 One of the seventy-seven new sections
enacted "authorize[d] binding panel [of] arbitration to decide a
claim at the election of the employee-claimant as an alternative to
the typical administrative decision. '""' The plaintiffs challenged
the new regulations after they were published, specifically the rule
which granted an employer the power to refuse an employee-
claimant's election of arbitration.'8 The plaintiffs contended that
the regulation was inconsistent with section 65-02-17 of the North
Dakota Century Code, which authorizes an employee-claimant to
select arbitration.'9 The trial court determined that the regulation
did not violate the statute, and thus was valid.2° The plaintiffs
appealed, contending that the regulation conflicted with section
65-02-18, "which gave an employee 'an absolute right to choose
the arbitration dispute resolution process' and 'does not allow for
or contemplate employer refusal to engage in arbitration.' ",21
The North Dakota Supreme Court first addressed the Work-
ers' Compensation Bureau's contention that the plaintiffs did not
have standing to bring their claim.22 In rejecting the defendant's
12. Turnbow, 479 N.W.2d at 831-32. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
Job Service, the agency, is "required to adopt rules explaining how it interprets or applies
the statutes that it administers and enforces . I..." Id  at 832.
13. 497 N.W.2d 700 (N.D. 1993).
14. Little v. Tracy, 497 N.W.2d 700 (N.D. 1993).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 701.
17. Id. at 700. The new provision establishes procedures for the selection and removal
of a panel of arbitrators and for the employee-claimant "to elect arbitration of the claim 'in
lieu of a formal administrative hearing or judicial remedy.'" Id. at 701.
18. Id. at 702. The new rule the plaintiffs challenged was section 92-01-02-26(2) of the
North Dakota Administrative Code. Id.
19. Little, 497 N.W.2d at 702.
20. Id. The court reasoned that the legislative history indicated that both an employee
and an employer must consent to binding arbitration. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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contention, the court noted that under the North Dakota statute,
"'[a]ny interested person who has participated in the rulemaking
process'" and represents persons affected by the regulation may
have a right to appeal.2 3 Thus, the plaintiffs had standing because
they had participated in the rulemaking process and because they
represented the interests of claimants who had elected
arbitration. 4
The supreme court next addressed the issue of whether the
challenged regulation violated the statute.25 The court noted that
a regulation must not be in conflict with a statute, because if it
conflicts, the regulation is then deemed invalid and beyond the
agency's authority to adopt.26 The defendant further contended
that "'it would be an 'unjust result' for an employee to 'dictate
whether or not an employer has a right to an appeal' and to 'effec-
tively bar the employer's right of appeal.' "27 The defendant
alleged that the statute was "'uncertain as to the rights of the
employer,"' and thus, the statue is consistent with the regulation
because the statute did not expressly require an employer to sub-
mit to arbitration.28  The court rejected the defendant's conten-
tion, holding that the statute was quite clear about giving
claimants a right to choose arbitration, and since the legislature
has clearly expressed its intention, the language of the statute
should not be expanded.29 The court added: "Usually, when the
plain meaning of a statute is apparent, it is unwise and unneces-
sary to delve further. ' 30 The court found that "from the usual
rules of statutory construction[] the statute gives the employee-
claimant an unrestricted election to arbitrate in lieu of an agency
hearing."3 " Therefore, the court concluded that the regulation
exceeded the defendant's authority and was invalid.3 2
23. Little, 497 N.W.2d at 702.
24. Id. at 703.
25. Id. The court noted that the new statutes were silent with respect to an employer's
ability or right to refuse or elect arbitration. Id. The court indicated that "[t]he challenged
feature of the regulation gives most employers a right to refuse the employee-claimant's
election of arbitration." Id. The court observed that "[alithough the new statutes express
the employer's role in selecting one member of the arbitration panel, they do not express a
role for the employer in the election to arbitrate. Still, the Bureau's regulation makes
arbitration hinge in most cases on the employer's consent or refusal." Id. (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 704. " 'It is a basic rule of administrative law that an administrative
regulation may not exceed statutory authority or supersede a statute, and that a regulation
which goes beyond what the Legislature has authorized is void."' Id. (citations omitted).
27. Little, 497 N.W.2d at 704.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 705.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Little, 497 N.W.2d at 706.
630 [Vol.. 69:627
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The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded to
the agency for disposition in accordance with the decision.3
AUTOMOBILES--DUI
State v. Larson
In State v. Larson,3 4 Larson and two others were traveling in a
bus towing a pickup and another vehicle.35 The bus broke down,
and the parties continued their journey with Larson steering the
bus and controlling the brakes, while another party pushed the bus
with the pickup.36 Soon thereafter, the pickup overheated and
Larson and the others drank alcohol while they waited for the
pickup to cool down. After resuming the trip, the convoy was
stopped by a North Dakota Highway Patrol officer who adminis-
tered a field sobriety test, and a blood-alcohol test to Larson. 8
Larson failed the field sobriety test and it was determined that he
had a blood-alcohol content of .19 percent by weight.39 Larson
was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI).4 °
Larson appealed the trial court's conviction. 4'
The issue on appeal was "whether Larson's control of the bus
while it was being pushed by another vehicle constituted 'driving'
under section 39-08-01 [of the North Dakota Century Code]." 42
The court construed the word "drive" as meaning "to control the
movement or direct the course of... an automobile. '43 The court
concluded that Larson did control the direction and the move-
ment of the bus and that he had the capacity to harm himself or
others by failing to steer the bus safely.44
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.45
33. Id.
34. 479 N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 1992).
35. State v. Larson, 479 N.W.2d 472, 472 (N.D. 1992).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Larson, 479 N.W.2d at 473. "[Larson] was neither charged nor convicted of being
in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence (APC)." Id.
41. Id. at 472.
42. Id. at 472-73. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (1988) (providing that "[a] person
may not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle . . . [with a] blood alcohol
concentration of at least ten one-hundredths of one percent by weight").
43. Larson, 479 N.W.2d at 473 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE
AMERICAN LANGUAGE (2nd College Ed. 1980)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 474.
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State v. Messner
In State v. Messner,4" Brian Messner appealed from a convic-
tion for driving under the influence, asserting that because he was
not given the opportunity to take an independent blood test, the
results of his intoxilyzer test should have been suppressed.47
After Messner failed several field sobriety tests, a police officer
arrested him for driving under the influence.4 The officer trans-
ported Messner to the Grand Forks County Correctional Center
where Messner agreed to take an intoxilyzer test.49 During the
test, Messner asked to be allowed to take a blood test.50 The police
officer told Messner that he wanted him to take the intoxilyzer test
"'right now.'"51 The officer later testified that he "'forgot
about"' Messner's request for a blood test.52 Messner's intoxilyzer
test registered a .18 percent blood alcohol content.5 3 After the
test, Messner was placed in a jail cell with access to a telephone. 4
The trial court found Messner guilty of driving under the influ-
ence.55 Messner appealed claiming that he was denied his statu-
tory right to an independent blood test.5 6
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that police do not
have a statutory duty to assist an individual in obtaining an
independent blood test.5 7 Instead, the police must give the arres-
tee a "reasonable opportunity" to obtain the test and may not
interfere with an individual's attempts to obtain an independent
test.58 Whether police have denied a reasonable opportunity to
take an independent test is an issue that is determined by consid-
ering the totality of the circumstances.59
The court found that Messner was promptly placed in a jail
cell with access to a telephone; therefore, he was not denied a
"reasonable opportunity to secure an independent test. ' 60 The
police did not interfere with any attempt by Messner to obtain a
46. 481 N.W.2d 236 (N.D. 1992).
47. State v. Messner, 481 N.W.2d 236, 237 (N.D. 1992).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Messner, 481 N.W.2d at 237.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 237-38.
55. Id. at 238.
56. Id.
57. Messner, 481 N.W.2d at 240.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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blood test.61 The court determined "for some unknown reason,
[Messer] simply did not pursue the matter. ' 62 The supreme court
upheld the trial court's conviction. 3
CIVIL PROCEDURE-APPEAL
Ceartin v. Ochs
In Ceartin v. Ochs,64 the issue addressed was whether an
order granting a new trial is appealable without Rule 54(b) N.D. R.
Civ. P certification.65 In this case, a jury awarded damages to the
plaintiff in a personal injury action.66 The defendants motioned
for a new trial, alleging they were prejudiced by the implicit and
explicit references to insurance made during the trial.6 ' Based on
the inappropriate references to the insurance information, the
trial court set aside the jury verdict and ordered a new trial.68 The
plaintiff appealed.69
The court first considered section 28-27-02 of the North
Dakota Century Code and determined that an order which grants
a new trial is an order which may be appealable. 70 The next step,
according to the court, is that there must be compliance with Rule
54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.7 1 Rule 54(b)
grants a trial court authority to enter a "final judgment (from
which an appeal may be taken) on less than all the claims if the
court expressly finds that there is no just reason for delay ....
The court recognized that Rule 54(b) is applicable to an order
granting a new trial, "because that order does not terminate the
action or any of the claims or parties in the action."' 73 Neverthe-
less, the court determined that this was not the type of case which
would warrant Rule 54(b) certification. 4
61. Id.
62. Messner, 481 N.W.2d at 240.
63. Id.
64. 479 N.W.2d 863 (N.D. 1992).
65. Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863, 863 (N.D. 1992).
66. Id. at 864. The defendants also moved, in the alternative, to reduce the damages
on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to justify damages in that amount. Id.
67. Id. During the trial, the motor vehicle crash report, which referred to the
defendant's insurance carrier, was introduced as an exhibit. The plaintiff's counsel also
remarked during the closing argument that the defendants would not be held personally
responsible for the amount of damages. Id.
68. Id. The court ordered in the alternative, remittitur of $46,000. Id.
69. Id.
70. Ceartin, 479 N.W.2d at 864.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 865. The court noted that Rule 54(b) is to be applied cautiously, and in most
cases Rule 54(b) certification is used in the "infrequent harsh case." Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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The supreme court stated that there is a lack of finality in an
order granting a new trial, which makes it unappealable. The
appeal was, therefore, dismissed.7 5
CIVIL PROCEDURE-APPEARANCE
Hatch v. Hatch
In Hatch v. Hatch,76 Joell Hatch claimed he made an appear-
ance after a default divorce decree was entered without notice to
him.77
Janice Hatch served Joell with a summons and complaint for
divorce in March, 1991.78 Joell neither answered nor formally
responded to the summons and complaint.79 Soon afterward, he
moved to Nebraska. 0 The children of the couple spent part of the
summer with Joell in Nebraska."' During one visit, their seven-
teen-year-old daughter contacted one of Janice's attorneys with
questions for Joell.82
In July, 1991, Janice's attorneys applied for an entry of a
default decree. 3 Joell was not served with a default application or
notice of hearing, and did not attend the hearing."' The trial court
awarded Janice a default divorce in August, 1991.85 The decree
granted her custody of the children and required Joell to pay $200
a month in child support.8 6 A mistake in the decree stated Joell's
child support obligation was $400 a month, which Janice promptly
corrected. 7 Another clerical error stated that Joell had responded
to the complaint by contacting Janice's attorneys."8 The error was
corrected and Joell did not submit any additional evidence about
his claimed appearance.8 9 The trial court subsequently issued an
amended decree,90 with notice of entry of the amended decree to
Joell.91
75. Ceartin, 479 N.W.2d at 865.
76. 484 N.W.2d 283 (N.D. 1992).
77. Hatch v. Hatch, 484 N.W.2d 283, 284 (N.D. 1992).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Hatch, 484 N.W.2d at 284.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Hatch, 484 N.W.2d at 284.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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Later, Joell served a proposed answer and counterclaim, and
moved to vacate the default divorce decree.92 Joell asserted that
he had made an appearance due to the error in the application
which stated he had done so and because his daughter had con-
tacted Janice's attorneys. 3 Joell admitted that he did not person-
ally contact Janice's attorneys, only that his minor daughter had.
The North Dakota Supreme Court refused to recognize the daugh-
ter's effort as an "appearance. '9 4 Joell also argued that his
"appearance" entitled him to a written notice on the application
for default.95 The court found that since Joell had not actually
appeared, he was not entitled to a notice of application.96
Finally, Joell claimed that he and Janice had " 'discussed issues
relating to this action with a view towards reaching an amicable
settlement."' Joell contended that these discussions constituted
an appearance.98 The court stated that without details as to
"when, where, or how the claimed discussions took place[,]" Joell
had not proved an appearance.99 Since Joell did not prove an
appearance in the divorce action, he was not entitled to a notice of
the application for fault. 00 The supreme court agreed with the
trial court's statement that rather than committing excusable
neglect by failing to appear, Joell had "'simply disregarded the
legal process . '.".."'101
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision.'0 2
CIVIL PROCEDURE-STANDARD OF REVIEW
Benson v. Benson
Judith Warner Benson and Michael L. Benson were divorced
in October of 1988.103 Their son, Patrick, was born on September
4, 1986. °4 Pursuant to the divorce decree Judith and Michael had
joint legal custody of Patrick, with Judith responsible for Patrick's
92. Hatch, 484 N.W.2d at 284.
93. Id. at 285.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. See N.D. R. CIv. P. 55 (providing in pertinent part that "[i]f the party against
whom judgment by default is sought has appeared .... the party ... must be served with
written notice of the application for judgment at least 8 days before the hearing on the
application[]").
97. Id.
98. Hatch, 484 N.W.2d at 285.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 286.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 286-87.
103. Benson v. Benson, 495 N.W.2d 72, 74 (N.D. 1993).
104. Id.
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physical custody and care.105 The decree also included a provision
which stated that Patrick could not be removed from North
Dakota without the written consent of the other party or by an
order from the court.1°6
Judith, however, removed Patrick from North Dakota and
moved to Minnesota to seek employment, without either
Michael's or the court's permission. 10 7  In response, Michael
moved for a "change of physical custody of Patrick."'0 8  Judith
then made a motion for the court's permission to move Patrick out
of the state. 0 9 Judith's motion was heard before a judicial referee,
who granted the motion based on affidavits and testimony that the
move would be in Patrick's best interests." 0 Michael asserted that
the referee's decision was erroneous and filed a request for review
with the district court."' The district court agreed with Michael,
vacated the referee's decision, and denied Judith's motion to move
move to Minnestota with Patrick." 2 Judith appealed the district
court's decision, asserting that the referee's decision was not
clearly erroneous and should not have been disturbed." 3 The
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed."14
The supreme court first recognized that section 27-05-30 of
the North Dakota Century Code, which authorizes courts to assign
referees to certain cases, and Rule 13 of the North Dakota
Supreme Court Administrative Rules and Administrative Orders,
which addresses the "procedure" for review of a judicial referee's
recommendations and findings, do not set forth a standard of
review for district courts to use with respect to decisions of judicial
referees. 115 Thus, the court noted that it was left without a stan-
dard of review which would govern a court's review of a referee's
105. Id. The decree provided that Michael would have Patrick forty percent of the
time, and Judith would have Patrick sixty percent of the time. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Benson, 495 N.W.2d at 74.
109. Id. Judith's motion was brought after Michael moved for a change of custody
when he learned of Judith's move. Id.
110. Id. at 74. The judicial referee reasoned that "Judith 'examined appropriate job
opportunities in the Fargo-Moorhead area,' that Judith was offered two jobs as a sales
representative in the Twin Cities area and that one of them 'would give her considerable
flexibility in her time and would allow her to spend more time with her child,' and that
Judith 'would have significant employment benefits which would become effective very
shortly after she accepts the position.'" Id.
111. Id. at 75.
112. Id. The district court determined that Judith's move without the court's or
Michael's consent violated the decree and that there was little evidence that the move
would be in Patrick's best interests. Id.
113. Benson, 495 N.W.2d at 75.
114. Id. at 78.
115. Id. at 76.
636 [Vol. 69:627
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
findings. 116 The court determined that the applicable standard in
the case at hand was to be governed by the clearly erroneous stan-
dard.' 7 The court noted that it preferred the clearly erroneous
standard "over the de novo review procedure employed in Minne-
sota."' 18 The court stated that:
If a district court must essentially duplicate the effort and
dedication of time of a judicial referee in order to ulti-
mately decide a domestic relations case, it is difficult to
comprehend what, if anything, has been gained by refer-
ral to a referee. Also, a judicial referee has all of the
authority of a district judge necessary to carry out dele-
gated duties and must observe the Rules of Judicial Con-
duct. Under these circumstances, a judicial referee, "as a
judicial officer, must as a general proposition be trusted as
to factual matters, particularly those involving oral and
disputed testimony."119
The court further opined that the same relationship that exists
between the supreme court and district courts should also exist
between district courts and judicial referees, and findings of fact
may not be set aside merely because one court has viewed the evi-
dence differently.12 0
The supreme court adopted a two-step approach taken by a
number of federal courts which have addressed the same issue:
First, we must review, as a matter of law, the correctness
of the district court's reversal, under the clearly errone-
ous standard, of any factual findings by the judicial refe-
ree. Second, if the district court's reversal of findings is
upheld, we must then review the substitute or additional
findings of the district court under the clearly erroneous
standard of Rule 52(a), N.D. R. Civ. p.121
The court noted that the district court did not determine that
any of the referee's findings were clearly erroneous; rather, the
district court had simply viewed and weighed the evidence differ-
ently and reached a contrary determination. 122 Additionally, the
116. Id. at 77.
117. Id.
118. Benson, 495 N.W.2d at 77.
119. Id. (citations omitted).
120. Id. The court stated that "[t]he 'clearly erroneous' standard here applied is
exactly the same as the standard governing review by' this court of findings of fact by a
district court." Id. at 78.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 78.
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district court failed to give any reasons for its determination and
did not make any findings that would support its position that Pat-
rick should not move. 12 3 The supreme court determined that a
court must state facts and articulate its reasoning that support its
decision in sufficient detail to enable the supreme court to accom-
plish a meaningful review.' 2 4 The trial court failed to do so in this
case. 125
The district court's order was reversed and remanded for a
review of the referee's findings.12 6
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CHALLENGE TO STATUTE
Syverson, Rath, Mehrer, P.C. v. Peterson
In Syverson, Rath, Mehrer, P.C. v. Peterson,27 the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that section 54-10-14 of the North
Dakota Century Code was constitutional.'12  Section 54-10-14
authorizes the State Auditor to assess a fee to public accountants
who audit political subdivisions" 'for the related costs of reviewing
the audit report.' "129
Syverson, Rath, and Mehrer (hereinafter Syverson) is an
accounting firm engaged in the auditing of political subdivi-
sions. 130 Pursuant to section 54-10-14 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code, the State Auditor imposed a fee on Syverson "'for the
related costs of reviewing the audit report.' "1"" Syverson chal-
lenged the fee, alleging that it was an improper tax on private
business and local governments, and was thus unconstitutional. 32
The trial court held that the statute was constitutional because the
123. Benson, 495 N.W.2d at 78. The court stated that "[iln this case our appellate
function is hampered because it appears that the district court employed an incorrect
standard in rejecting the referee's findings and because the district court failed to make
adequate substitute findings to support its contrary decision." Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 495 N.W.2d 79 (N.D. 1993).
128. Syverson, Rath, Mehrer, P.C. v. Peterson, 495 N.W.2d 79, 81 (1993).
129. Id. at 79. The State Auditor was responsible for auditing state agencies but not
political subdivisions of the state until 1967. Id. In 1967, the North Dakota Legislature
instructed the State Auditor to audit the political subdivisions as well. Id. The legislature
authorized political subdivisions "to hire a public accountant to conduct the audit, 'and then
the state auditor is not required to make the examination .... '" Id. at 80. The Auditor is
required to review the public accountant's report for irregularities and is directed to
resume the audit if they are not duly corrected. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-10-14 (1986 & Supp. 1991). Section 54-10-14
authorizes the State Auditor to charge for the costs of reviewing the report of a public
accountant's audit of a political subdivision." Syverson, 495 N.W.2d at 80.
132. Id. Syverson also alleged that the fee was unreasonable and that it did not relate
to the amount of work that had been completed. Id.
638 [Vol. 69:627
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fee imposed was a regulatory fee rather than a tax. 133
On appeal, Syverson contended that the fee was a tax, that the
language of the statute was too vague because it gave the Auditor
excessive discretion in implementing the statute, and that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional. 134 The North Dakota Supreme Court
first addressed Syverson's contention that the statute was too
vague. 13 5 The court looked at the" 'may charge' "language of the
statute and determined that the language did not give the State
Auditor impermissible discretion because it did not give the Audi-
tor the power to choose which political subdivisions could be
charged for a review of the audit.136
The court next rejected Syverson's contention that the
charged fee was an impermissible tax. 137 The court found that
Syverson did not cite or refer to any constitutional sections which
regulate taxes, and thus, the issue of whether the fee was an inva-
lid tax was not before the court.' 38
Finally, the court addressed the constitutionality of the stat-
ute.139 The court rejected Syverson's contention that the statute
authorizes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative author-
ity.140 The court noted that it had previously stated that the legis-
lature may delegate power to an executive agency, as long as the
entire power to legislate is not delegated.' 4 ' The State Auditor
can charge only public accountants who have reviewed an audit
report of a political subdivision; the Auditor is not given the power
to decide who shall pay the fee. ' 42 The court also noted that dele-
gated power is not unconstitutional if the guidelines to be followed
are reasonable.' 43 The court recognized that the guideline which
the State Auditor is required to follow, " 'the related costs of
reviewing the audit report,' -144 is reasonable because it is suffi-
ciently clear as to its meaning, and at the same time limits the
133. Id. The trial court found that the fee was "'imposed solely to cover the cost of
reviewing audit reports for political subdivisions when [the] audits are performed by
private firms.'" Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Syverson, 495 N.W.2d at 80-81.
137. Id. at 81.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Syverson, 495 N.W.2d at 81. See Southern Valley Grain Dealers v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 257 N.W.2d 425,434 (N.D. 1977); Ralston Purina Co. v. Hagemeister, 188
N.W.2d 405 (N.D. 1971).
142. Syverson, 495 N.W.2d at 82.
143. Id. at 82-83.
144. Id. at 82.
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Auditor's discretionary power. 145
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
order. 146
CONTRACTS-RESTRAINT ON TRADE
Werlinger v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co.
In Werlinger v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co. 141 (hereinafter
MSI), the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a noncompeti-
tion clause in an agent's employment contract was void under sec-
tion 9-08-06 of the North Dakota Century Code as a restraint of
trade. 148
The plaintiff had worked for the defendant as an insurance
agent for fourteen years until he resigned in 1991.149 The plain-
tiff's contract with the defendant awarded the plaintiff termina-
tion compensation, which was a percentage of the service fees that
he had been paid within the last year.150 The contract also con-
tained a noncompetition provision which stated that the agent
would forfeit termination compensation if he worked as an agent
for another insurance company within a twenty-five mile radius of
the defendant within one year after the termination. 15 1 Immedi-
ately upon his resignation, the plaintiff was employed as an agent
by another insurance company within twenty-five miles of the
defendant.'5 2 Consequently, MSI refused to pay the plaintiff the
termination compensation based on the noncompetition clause of
the contract.15 3 The plaintiff sued, and the trial court found for
the plaintiff, holding that the noncompetition clause was void,
unenforceable, and a restraint of trade under section 9-08-06 of
the North Dakota Century Code.15 4
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's determination.15  The supreme court recognized that
145. Id. at 83.
146. Id.
147. 496 N.W.2d 26 (N.D. 1993).
148. Werlinger v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co. N.W.2d 26, 27 (N.D. 1993).
149. Id. at 27.
150. Id. According to Paragraph 12(A) of the contract, "an agent, with at least 500
policies and at least five years of service would, upon termination, be paid termination
compensation of a 'percentage of the service fees paid to you by each company for the last
full 12 calendar months immediately preceding such termination.' " Id.
151. Id.
152. Werlinger, 496 N.W.2d at 27.
153. Id. at 27.
154. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1991) (providing in pertinent part that
"[e]very contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful progression, trade,
or business of any kind is to that extent void").
155. Id. at 30.
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in affirming the trial court's decision, it would be required to over-
rule its earlier decision in Ceiss v. Northern Ins. Agency. 156 In
Geiss, which is factually similar to the present case, the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that "the noncompetition clause in
the parties' employment contract was not a restraint of trade. 15 7
The supreme court noted that the Geiss decision failed to
identify that a restraint need not be absolute to be unlawful. 15
Additionally, the court noted that both in the present case and in
Geiss, the important feature of the contracts was that the compa-
nies restrained trade by imposing upon their agents to avoid forfei-
ture of money that would otherwise be paid to them.159 The
contract in the present case restrains the plaintiff from competing
with the defendant "by requiring that he 'purchase the freedom'
to compete with MSI by forfeiting money that MSI would other-
wise pay to him.' 160 The contract also restrains the plaintiff from
competing with the defendant by imposing a penalty on him in
the form of a forfeiture of the money to which he is otherwise enti-
tled if he does so compete. 16 1 The court concluded that the non-
competition clause of the parties' contract constituted an unlawful
restraint of trade and was void. 162
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. 163
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSTRUCTION OF CONSPIRACY STATUTE
State v. Rambousek
In State v. Rambousek,164 Rambousek appealed from a jury
verdict finding him guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. 165 The
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, 166 reason-
ing that under section 12.1-06-04(1) of the North Dakota Century
Code, a bilateral agreement between co-conspirators is not neces-
sary to support a finding of conspiracy. 67
156. Id. at 28 (citing Geiss v. Northern Ins. Agency, 153 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1967)).
157. Werlinger, 496 N.W.2d at 29.
158. Id. at 29.
159. Id. at 28.
160. Id. at 30 (citations omitted).
161. Id.
162. Werlinger, 496 N.W.2d at 30.
163. Id. at 30. Justice VandeWalle concurred specially, writing separately to convey
his belief "that agreements prohibiting an employee from soliciting the employee's clients
during the term of the employment are valid, notwithstanding section 9-08-06, NDCC." Id.
at 31.
164. 479 N.W.2d 832 (N.D. 1992).
165. State v. Rambousek, 479 N.W. 2d 832, 833 (N.D. 1992).
166. Id. at 837.
167. See id. at 835 (stating that the North Dakota Legislature intended a unilateral
rather than a bilateral approach to conspiracy).
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Rambousek met with three individuals in a Dickinson motel
room.' 68 Two of the individuals were State Crime Bureau agents
and the third was an informant with the Dickinson Police Depart-
ment. 16 9 The parties planned the murder of a witness who had
obtained incriminating evidence against Rambousek. 7 0
Rambousek gave one of the agents a signed certificate of title to a
car as "partial payment for the contemplated murder."' 1
Rambousek was charged with and convicted of criminal conspir-
acy to commit murder by the trial court.17 2
On appeal, Rambousek's primary contention was that section
12.1-06-04(1) of the North Dakota Century Code requires a bilat-
eral agreement among conspirators, and that this essential ele-
ment was not present because his co-conspirators had no intention
of carrying out the murder. 173 The State asserted that the statute
requires only a unilateral agreement and is not dependent upon
the intentions of the co-conspirators. 174  The North Dakota
Supreme Court concluded that the statute was ambiguous and
looked to the legislative history to resolve the ambiguity. 75 The
court looked to the commentaries of the Federal Criminal Code,
from which section 12.1-06-04(1) of the Century Code is derived,
and stated that the legislature intended a unilateral, not a bilateral,
approach to conspiracy.' 76 According to the unilateral approach,
the court determined the defendant need only "believe that he
was participating in an agreement with another to engage in crim-
inal conduct, manifested by some overt act . . . [in order] to be
guilty of conspiracy.' 77
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.' 78
168. Id. at 833.
169. Id.
170. Rambousek, 479 N.W.2d at 833.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part, that "[a] person commits conspiracy if
he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause conduct which, in fact, constitutes
an offense or offenses, and any one or more of such persons does an overt act to effect an
objective of the conspiracy." Id. The defendant contended that the words "agrees" and
"agreement" within the statute require mutual assent among the conspirators and that a
meeting of the minds is a necessary element of the conspiracy charge. Id.
174. Id.
175. Rambousek, 479 N.W. 2d at 834.
176. Id. at 835.
177. Id. at 835.
178. Id. at 837.
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CRIMINAL LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY
State v. Lange
In State v. Lange,'79 Lange appealed his conviction of gross
sexual imposition pursuant to section 12.1-20-03 of the North
Dakota Century Code.'8 0
The State alleged that Lange raped the complainant in one
county, then drove her to another county and raped her again.'18
The defendant contended that the sexual contacts between them
were consensual.'1 2 Lange was first tried in Mercer County and
was acquitted of one charge of felonious restraint and two charges
of gross sexual imposition.'8 3  Lange was later tried in Oliver
county and was convicted of one count of gross sexual imposi-
tion.18 4 At the second trial, Lange moved to the dismiss the
charges based on double jeopardy and collateral estoppel.8 5
Lange also sought to cross-examine the complainant regarding her
counseling records.186 The trial court denied the Lange's motions
to dismiss and refused to allow Lange's cross-examination
request.'8 7 On appeal, Lange alleged that the trial court's denial
of his motions was erroneous.'8 8
The North Dakota Supreme Court first addressed Lange's col-
lateral estoppel claim.' 8 9 The court recognized that the party rais-
ing collateral estoppel has the burden of proving it by satisfying a
four-part test.' 90 The court determined that the first part of the
179. 497 N.W. 2d 83 (N.D. 1993).
180. State v. Lange, 497 N.W.2d 83 (N.D. 1993).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 84.
184. Id.
185. Lange, 497 N.W.2d at 83.
186. Id. at 84.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 85.
189. ld. The court pointed out that res judicata (also referred to as claim preclusion)
and collateral estoppel (also referred to as issue preclusion) are doctrines which are present
within the double jeopardy clause of the North Dakota and United States Constitutions. Id.
The court noted that this was not a case of res judicata because the offense was a separate
crime which had not been previously tried. Id.
190. Lange, 497 N.W.2d at 85. The court stated that:
the party seeking the application of collateral estoppel, [the defendant] has the
burden of proving the points of a four-part test which must be met before
collateral estoppel will be found to bar relitigation of a fact or issue involved in
an earlier lawsuit: (1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical to
the one presented in the action in question?; (2) Was there a final judgment on
the merits?; (3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in
privity with a party to the prior adjudication?; and (4) Was the party against
whom the plea is asserted given a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue?
Id. (citing Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380 (N.D. 1988)).
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test was not satisfied because "the same facts which give rise to the
issue of consent were not the same facts used in the Mercer
County trial and are not thereby prohibited by collateral estop-
pel."' 9' The court concluded that the second county trial was not
based upon the same issue that was decided in the first trial, and,
consequently, collateral estoppel did not bar the issue.19 2
The court rejected Lange's claim that the trial court erred in
not allowing him to cross-examine the complainant in regard to
her counseling records.' 93 The court noted that complainant's
records constituted confidential communications between a coun-
selor and a victim, and the State did not waive its privilege. 94 The
State introduced the complainant's evidence of counseling only to
prove that she had received counseling. 195
The trial court's judgment was affirmed. 19 6
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE
State v. Anderson
In State v. Anderson,'9 7 Barbara Jean Anderson appealed from
a conviction of aggravated assault stemming from the burning of
her ten-month-old son.' 98 During her jury trial, Anderson had
claimed the child had been injured when he accidentally fell into a
bathtub of scalding hot water.' 99 The state, however, had argued
that Anderson had placed her son face down into scalding
water.2 oo
Anderson appealed her conviction, contending that the trial
court erred in excluding photographs of her fully-healed son which
were offered into evidence. 20 ' The state maintained that since the
condition of the child at a later date was not a fact in issue, the
photographs were irrelevant.2 0°
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the photo-
graphs were indeed relevant since the charge of aggravated
assault alleged that she willfully inflicted serious bodily injury on
191. Id. at 86.
192. Id. at 87.
193. Id. at 88.
194. Id.
195. Lange, 496 N.W.2d at 88.
196. Id.
197. 480 N.W.2d 727 (N.D. 1992).
198. State v. Anderson, 480 N.W.2d 727, 728 (N.D. 1992).
199. Id. at 728.
200. Id at 729.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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the child.2 ° a Serious permanent disfigurement is an element of
serious bodily injury, 0 4 and although the state did not argue disfig-
urement to the jury, it did show photographs of the child's burns,
from which the jury could infer that he suffered disfigurement.20 5
Since Anderson was not given the opportunity to rebut the disfig-
urement element of the aggravated assault charge, the supreme
court reversed her conviction.2 0 6
Anderson also argued that the trial court erred by refusing to
use her requested jury instructions, alleging that such a failure was
a denial of "an instruction on the law supporting her theory of the
case."207 Anderson's instruction was derived from California crim-
inal law and included an element of California criminal law with
which Anderson had not been charged. 20  The instruction, there-
fore, misstated the applicable North Dakota law.2 09 The court thus
determined the trial court did not err in refusing the
instruction.2 1 0
Next, Anderson contended that the jury instructions did not
allow her to argue that the child was burned by accident.21  The
court found that although the words "'misfortune'" or "'acci-
dent'" were not part of the court's instruction, the instructions, as
a whole, properly stated the applicable law. 2  However, the
court noted that since it was reversing Anderson's conviction and
remanding for a new trial, an instruction which "addresses [her]
accident theory without.., misstating North Dakota law[] would
be proper. ' 2 13
Finally, Anderson claimed the circumstantial evidence
presented in the case was insufficient to support the guilty ver-
dict.21 4 The court noted that "[a] verdict based upon circumstan-
tial evidence [alone] carries the same presumption of correctness
as other verdicts" and will justify a conviction if the evidence "is of
203. Anderson, 480 N.W.2d at 729.
204. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04(27) (1985) (providing that ""[s]erious bodily
injury' means bodily injury... which causes serious permanent disfigurement .....
205. Anderson, 480 N.W.2d at 729.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 730.
209. Id.
210. Anderson, 480 N.W.2d at 730.
211. Id.
212. Id. The court stated that "a court is not required to submit instructions [to the
jury] in the specific language requested by a defendant." Id. (citation omitted). "Jury
instructions must be considered as a whole . . . [; 'they] must correctly and adequately
inform the jury of the applicable law and must not mislead or confuse the jury."' Id.
(citations omitted).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 730.
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such probative force as to enable the trier of fact to find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.-2 1 5 The court stated
that the record showed "competent evidence" from which the
jury could have reasonably inferred Anderson's guilt.216  The
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the conviction and
remanded for a new trial on the charge of aggravated assault.2 17
CRIMINAL LAW-REASONABLE SUSPICION
City of Grafton v. Swanson
At 3:20 p.m. on March 19, 1992, Officer Joel D. Scharf of the
Grafton City Police Department investigated a domestic distur-
bance complaint at a local residence.218 Officer Scharf was
informed by Linda Ratliffe that she and Robert G. Swanson had an
argument and that the defendant vandalized her car and left the
premises in a very intoxicated state.219 Officer Scharf located the
Swanson at approximately 3:45 p.m. at a local bar. Officer Scharf
spoke with Swanson and found him to be very intoxicated. 2
Officer Scharf warned Swanson not to drive and then left the
bar.22
1
Later that evening, Officer Scharf observed Swanson driving
toward Ratliffe's home. Officer Scharf followed him.22 Swanson
parked in Ratliffe's driveway, and Officer Scharf parked his vehicle
in the street, blocking the driveway.223 Officer Scharf stopped the
defendant as he walked toward the house.224 Officer Scharf
noticed that Swanson appeared to be very intoxicated, and asked
Swanson to take field sobriety tests.225 Swanson refused.226 Swan-
son was subsequently arrested for driving under the influence.227
215. Anderson, 480 N.W.2d at 730-31 (citation omitted).
216. Id. at 731.
217. Id. Justice Meschke concurred, opining that "an instruction that addresses
Anderson's defense of accident would not only be proper at the new trial; it would be
imperative." Id.
218. City of Grafton v. Swanson, 497 N.W.2d 421, 422 (N.D. 1993).
219. Id. at 422. Ratliffe also informed Officer Scharf that she owned the house, and did
not want Swanson to return. Id.
220. Id. Although Officer Scharf did not actually observe the defendant consuming
any alcohol, he detected a strong odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath and noticed the
defendant's stagger and slurred speech. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. Officer Scharf followed Swanson for one-half a block, noticing no traffic
violations or unusual driving. Id.
223. Swanson, 497 N.W.2d at 422.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. Officer Scharf noticed the defendant's glassy eyes and slurred speech and
detected a strong odor of alcohol. Id.
227. Id.
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At his trial, Swanson argued that the stop was illegal and moved to
suppress evidence.2"' The trial court denied the motion, and
Swanson was thereafter found guilty of driving under the
influence.229
On appeal, Swanson contended that the main issue was
whether the stop occurred when the officer parked behind the
defendant, or whether the stop occurred when the officer physi-
cally restrained the defendant and requested his submission to
field sobriety tests.230 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated
that the time the stop occurred was immaterial, since in either
event the stop was justified.231 The court reasoned that although
Officer Scharf did not notice Swanson driving in an erratic man-
ner, the officer's stop was justified because of his concern to curtail
any possible domestic violence.232 The stop was justified because
the officer had a "reasonable and articuable suspicion that a
crime-domestic violence or trespassing-was about to occur. "233
Officer Scharf had knowledge that some type of violence had
occurred earlier in the day, and this knowledge, along with the
knowledge that Swanson was intoxicated and was returning to the
scene where the violence occurred earlier, prompted a reasonable
and valid suspicion that a crime was about to occur.234
Additionally, the court noted that the officer also had a reason-
able suspicion that Swanson was driving under the influence.235
Officer Scharf testified that the defendant was drunk when he
spoke with him earlier in the day and that the defendant indicated
to him that he was going to continue to drink through the night. 36
The court opined that under the circumstances, it was not unrea-
sonable for the officer to suspect the defendant of being intoxi-
228. Swanson, 497 N.W.2d at 422.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 423. The defendant contends that if the stop occurred when the officer
parked behind him, the stop was illegal because the officer did not have reasonable and
articulable suspicion that a crime was in progress. Id.
The trial court found that the stop occurred when the defendant was physically
restrained and requested to submit to field sobriety tests. Id. at 422-23. The supreme court
held that if the stop occurred at this point, there would be no doubt that the stop was valid.
Id. at 423.
231. Id. The court stated that "[w]hether the stop occurred when Officer Scharf
physically restrained Swanson, or whether the stop occurred when Officer Scharf pulled up
in his patrol car behind Swanson's vehicle in Ratliffe's driveway, if that action would qualify
as a stop, is immaterial. In either instance, the stop was justified." Id. at 425.
232. Id. at 423.
233. Swanson, 497 N.W.2d at 424.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 424-25.
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cated when the officer saw Swanson four hours later.23 7
The judgment of conviction was affirmed.2 3 8
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE
State v. Birk
In State v. Birk, 39 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
information obtained from an anonymous caller constituted prob-
able cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant. 4 °
On November 21, 1990, a Bismarck police officer received an
anonymous phone call from an individual who alleged to have
information about possible criminal activity by the defendant.2 4'
The caller provided the officer with the defendant's name, a physi-
cal description of the defendant, the defendant's address, informa-
tion that the defendant was unemployed, the type of vehicle and
motorcycle that the defendant owned, and information that the
defendant had amounts of marijuana in his residence. 42 Based on
the informant's information and the officer's own personal knowl-
edge of the defendant, a search warrant was issued. 43 During the
subsequent search, amounts of marijuana, as well as other drug
paraphernalia, were found. 44
Timothy Birk appealed his conviction in the trial court of
manufacturing a controlled substance, alleging that there was a
lack of probable cause for a search warrant.245 Birk also con-
tended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence.246 The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with
the defendant and affirmed the trial court's decision.247
The supreme court recognized that "information supplied by
an anonymous informant cannot alone establish probable cause for
a search warrant if the tip provides virtually nothing from which
one might conclude that the informant is honest or that his infor-
mation is reliable, or if the information provides no indication of
the basis for the informant's predictions regarding a defendant's
237. Id. at 425.
238. Swanson, 497 N.W.2d at 425.
239. 484 N.W.2d 834 (N.D. 1992).
240. State v. Birk, 484 N.W.2d 834, 838 (N.D. 1992).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 835-36.
243. Id. at 836, 838.
244. Id. at 836.
245. Birk, 484 N.W.2d at 836.
246. Id. at 835.
247. Id.
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criminal activities. '2 48 The court noted that the knowledge and
veracity of the informant are very relevant, especially if the infor-
mation can be corroborated by a law enforcement officer. 49 The
court found the informant's information was corroborated by the
officer's personal knowledge, and thus, the information obtained
from the informant was relevant.2 50  The court rejected the
defendant's argument that there was no probable cause because
the police had failed to conduct a personal surveillance of the
defendant's residence.25 ' The court determined the officer had
previously personally observed the defendant's residence, and the
large number of short term visitors was indicative of drug traffick-
ing.252 The court also determined that because of both the inform-
ant's call and the police officer's personal knowledge, the evidence
was sufficient for concluding the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant.2 5 3
Both Justices Meschke and Levine dissented in the opinion.
Justice Meschke argued that the informant's information was noth-
ing more than unverified rumors; therefore, probable cause for the
search was lacking. 25 4  Justice Levine agreed with Justice
Meschke's view that the warrant was issued on the basis of
"rumor" and "stale information. 2 5 5 Justice Levine pointed out
that the police did little investigation and surveillance, and relying
on an old suspicion did not justify probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant.256
The judgment of conviction was affirmed. 5 1
State v. Erickson
In State v. Erickson,258 the North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed a trial court's determination finding the defendant guilty
of the unlawful possession of drugs.2 59 The court held that
although probable cause existed to justify issuing the search war-
rant, the police officers conducting the search exceeded the scope
248. Id. at 836-37 (citing State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 367 (N.D. 1985)).
249. Id. at 837.
250. Birk, 484 N.W.2d at 837.
251. Id. at 838.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 840.
254. Id. at 841.
255. Birk, 484 N.W.2d at 842.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 840.
258. 496 N.W.2d 555 (N.D. 1993).
259. State v. Erickson, 496 N.W.2d 555 (N.D. 1993).
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of the warrant.2 °
On March 14, 1992, while investigating the defendant's
alleged involvement with drugs, police officers uncovered small
amounts of marijuana along with an envelope addressed to the
defendant in a garbage dumpster behind the defendant's resi-
dence. 261 The next day, the officers again found small plastic bags
with marijuana in the same dumpster, along with a traffic citation
issued to the defendant. 262 A search warrant for the defendant's
residence in the West apartment of a duplex was issued and exe-
cuted on March 17, 1993.263 Upon entering the residence, one
officer found cash, a book on how to grow marijuana, a scale, and a
canister with marijuana residue in it located in a basement room
which was under the neighboring apartment. 6 4 Marijuana was
also found in other parts of the defendant's residence and on his
person. 265 The defendant was arrested and charged with posses-
sion of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, and subse-
quently, entered a conditional plea of guilty.26 6 The trial court
denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained
from the search "on the grounds that there was insufficient prob-
able cause to issue the warrant and that the search warrant failed
to adequately describe the place to be searched. 267
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court first addressed
the issue of whether there was probable cause to issue the search
warrant. 268 The court determined that the evidence was sufficient
to establish probable cause.269 The court noted that the proper
test for reviewing probable cause is the totality-of-the-circum-
stances test.2 7 0 Under this test,
"[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, includ-
ing the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons sup-
260. Id. at 557.
261. Id.
262. Id. The officers also found several marijuana cigarettes as well as plant material
and seeds, which later tested positive for marijuana. Id. at 557 n.1.
263. Id. The defendant resided on the west side of a duplex, while the east side of the
duplex contained a separate apartment with a separate address. Id.
264. Erickson, 496 N.W.2d at 557-58.
265. Id. at 558.
266. Id. "The intent to deliver portion of the charge was based upon the items found
in the [neighboring] basement room." Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 558.
269. Erickson, 496 N.W.2d at 559.
270. Id. at 558.
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plying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a par-
ticular place.12
71
A previewing court need only determine whether "'the mag-
istrate had a 'substantial basis for. . . concluding' that probable
cause existed.' "272 The court found that the incriminating evi-
dence that the officers found in the dumpster constituted a "cir-
cumstantial link" that could reasonably have been connected to
the defendant. The court opined that the direct evidence of
the marijuana found on the defendant and in his home, along with
the marijuana and plastic bags found in the garbage dumpster sup-
ported a determination of probable cause.2 7 4
The court next addressed defendant's argument that the war-
rant was defective because it inadequately described the place
that was to be searched.2 7 5 The court agreed with the defendant,
stating that a search is limited to the premises specifically
described in the warrant.2 76 In the present case, the warrant
described only the defendant's residence in the west side of the
duplex, yet the officers searched the basement of the east side of
the duplex where they found evidence which led to the arrest of
the defendant.27 7 The East duplex was a separate apartment that
was not under the exclusive control of the defendant.2 7 8 The court
concluded that the officers' search exceeded the scope of the
warrant.2 79
The court reversed and remanded to the trial court.2 80
271. Id. (quoting State v. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 207, 211 (N.D. 1988)).
272. Id. (quoting State v. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 207, 211, citing Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)).
273. Id. at 559. The defendant's name was on the envelope and a traffic citation was
discovered in the dumpster. Id. Additionally, the dumpster's location behind the
defendant's residence implied that the defendant used the dumpster and that the items
discovered therein belonged to him. Id.
274. Erickson, 496 N.W.2d at 559.
275. Id. at 560.
276. Id. The court noted that "[tihe authority to search is limited to the place
described in the warrant and does not include additional or different places." Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Erickson, 496 N.W.2d at 561.
280. Id. Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred specially. Id. Although indicating that
no issue as to the defendant's standing to contest the validity of the search was raised on
appeal, Justice VandeWalle addressed the issue of the defendant's standing in this case. Id.
In addressing the issue of the scope of the search warrant, Justice VandeWalle stated
that "[h]ad it not appeared that the room searched was part of another dwelling unit not
described in the warrant, I would vote to affirm . I..." Id. at 562.
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State v. Gilberts
Gilberts was a passenger in a car stopped for speeding by
Highway Patrolman Bradley Smith.28 1 The driver of the vehicle
was arrested for operating a vehicle with a suspended license.28 2
The officer then requested Gilberts to get out of the car.283 The
officer picked up a jacket that was in the front seat where Gilberts
was seated, searched the jacket, and found a large amount of cash
and a scale with cocaine residue on it.2 4 Gilberts was arrested for
the unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 8 5 The trial
court denied Gilberts' motion to suppress evidence, Gilberts
entered a conditional guilty plea, and the trial court subsequently
convicted him.286 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed
Gilberts' conviction, holding that the search of the jacket was ifile-
gal and that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evi-
dence obtained in the search.287
The first issue the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed
was whether the officer's request that Gilberts exit the car was rea-
sonable.28 8 The court noted that the officer's request was justified
on two grounds which made the "brief intrusion" upon his privacy
permissible and reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 2 9
First, the court stated that for safety reasons an officer is justified in
ordering both the driver and the passengers from a lawfully
detained vehicle. 29' The court noted that the safety of the police
outweighs any minor intrusion on a passenger's freedom in leaving
a vehicle.2 9' Second, the court stated that the officer's request was
justified because, incident to the driver's arrest, the officer had a
right to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 92 To
conduct a thorough search safely, the court opined that it was rea-
sonable and necessary for Smith to ask the passengers to exit the
281. State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 94 (N.D. 1993).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 95. "Smith testified that he 'secured the driver in the back seat of my patrol
vehicle' and then went back to search the car 'incident to the arrest of the driver.'" Id.
284. Id. Upon questioning, Gilberts admitted to the patrolman that the jacket
belonged to him. Id.
285. Id.
286. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d at 94.
287. Id. at 93.
288. Id. at 95.
289. Id. at 96
290. Id.
291. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d at 96. The court stated that "[w]hen the state's interest in
the protection and safety of its police, who patrol the roadways, is weighed against the
minor intrusion on a passenger's liberty in momentarily leaving a vehicle, safety
predominates."
292. Id.
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vehicle.293 Thus, Gilberts' Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable search and seizure were not violated when the
officer asked him to step from the vehicle in order to conduct a
vehicle search after the driver's arrest.294
The second issue the court addressed was whether Gilberts'
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officer
searched his jacket.295 The State argued that under the United
States Supreme Court case of New York v. Belton,296 Officer Smith
was entitled, incident to the driver's arrest, to search the entire
passenger compartment and all containers discovered therein,
including Gilberts' jacket.297 The court, however, distinguished
Belton, noting that Belton did not address an officer's search of a
non-arrested occupant.298 "Here, Gilberts was not an arrestee, but
merely a passenger in the vehicle with a driver who was driving
without a license."'299 The court determined that Belton was not
applicable and that the driver's arrest, standing alone, did not jus-
tify the infringement upon Gilberts' constitutional rights against
an unreasonable search and seizure.300
The court also rejected the State's argument that People v.
Prance,30 a case which upheld a warrantless search of a passenger,
was controlling.30 2 The court distinguished Prance on the ground
that Officer Smith did not have reasonable suspicion to believe
that Gilberts possessed any illegal contraband. 30 3 Thus, the search
of Gilberts' jacket was an unjustifiable infringement on his rights
against an unreasonable search and seizure, and the trial court
erred in denying Gilberts' motion to suppress evidence obtained
as a result of an illegal search.30 4
The conviction by the trial court was reversed and remanded
with directions that Gilbert be afforded the opportunity to with-
draw his guilty plea.305
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
297. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d at 96.
298. Id. at 96.
299. Id. at 96-97. The court stated that "this factual distinction limits a Belton search of
the vehicle." Id. at 97.
300. Id. The record indicated that Patrolman Smith knew that the jacket belonged to
Gilberts rather than the arrested driver. Id.
301. 226 Cal. App. 3d 1525 (Cal. App. 1st. Dist. 1991).
302. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d at 97.
303. Id. at 98.
304. Id. at 99.
305. Id.
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CRIMINAL LAW-SENTENCING
State v. Foster
In State v. Foster,30 6 William Foster appealed a trial court's
decision to resentence him after the court learned that Foster had
concealed his true identity at his original sentencing. 307
Foster was using the identity of Robert John Langton when he
was arrested for aggravated assault and terrorizing. 30 He contin-
ued to assume Langton's identity and was sentenced under
Langton's name to three years in prison for each count which was
to be served concurrently. 30 9 The entire sentence of three years
was suspended, with the exception of 125 days already served, and
Foster was placed on probation.31 0 Less than a month later, Fos-
ter's true identity was revealed.31' The trial court resentenced
Foster to five years on both counts to be served consecutively,
with one year suspended on the second count.3 12
Foster appealed the trial court's decision, claiming that the
sentencing violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the court did not have authority to resentence
him.313
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution protects
against multiple prosecutions for the same offense.314 Foster
argued that his resentencing subjected him to multiple punish-
ments for the same offense. 315 The North Dakota Supreme Court
disagreed, noting that "'a sentence does not have the qualities of
finality that attend acquittal.' ",316 Because Foster had assumed
Langton's identity "to avoid consideration of his own extensive
criminal record[,]" Foster did not have a legitimate expectation of
finality in the initial sentence.317 The court stated that a person
should not be allowed to assume another's identity to avoid court
knowledge of his own record and should not expect that a sen-
tence will not be modified upon discovery of his true identity.318
306. 484 N.W.2d 113 (N.D. 1992).
307. State v. Foster, 484 N.W.2d 113, 114 (N.D. 1992).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Foster, 484 N.W.2d at 114.
313. Id. at 114-15.
314. Id. at 115.
315. Id.
316. Id. (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 134 (1980)).
317. Foster, 484 N.W.2d at 116.
318. Id.
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Therefore, there was no double jeopardy violation.319
Foster also claimed that the trial court did not have authority
to resentence him.32 ° However, the supreme court stated that the
trial court had resentenced Foster under North Dakota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 35,321 which allows a sentencing court to cor-
rect an illegal sentence.322 The court stated that when a defend-
ant misleads a court by assuming another's identity during
sentencing, the sentence is illegal, and is therefore subject to mod-
ification.323 Further, "[a]part from Rule 35,... a court of law has
the inherent authority to correct judgments obtained through
fraud." 324
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the district
court.3 2 5
FAMILY LAW-CHILD CUSTODY
Schestler v. Schestler
In Schestler v. Schestler,326 Wanda Schestler appealed a trial
court's order awarding custody of their two children to their
father.327
Wanda and Charles Schestler divorced in 1991.328 Wanda
obtained custody of her two daughters from a previous relation-
ships.3 29 The court, following an ordered "home study" and hear-
ing, awarded custody of the Schestler children to Charles with
liberal visitation for Wanda.33 °
Wanda appealed, claiming the trial court did not appropri-
ately consider the physical abuse Charles inflicted on her and the
negative effect the abuse had on the children. 3 1
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. "The sentencing court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may
correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the
reduction of sentence." N.D. R. CruM. P. 35.
322. Foster, 484 N.W.2d at 117.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. Justice Levine concurred, but voiced her concern that "this decision will be
used as a catapult to reopen all kinds of judgments." Id. at 118. Levine noted that a
sentence does not become illegal and thus subject to modification every time a defendant
"'misleads"'" the sentencing court and stressed that a deception other than fraudulent
identification would not necessarily provide a basis for a change of sentence. Id.
326. 486 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1992).
327. Schestler v. Schestler, 486 N.W.2d 509, 510 (N.D. 1992).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. Domestic violence is one of the specific factors to be considered in awarding
custody. Id. at 510-11. "Neither the statutes nor their legislative history indicate a priority
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The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that credible evi-
dence which supports the existence of domestic violence creates a
rebuttable presumption that the children's best interests are not
served by awarding custody to the abusive parent.332 The trial
court found Charles abused Wanda and inappropriately teased her
daughters, creating a rebuttable presumption that it would not be
in the children's best interests to place them in Charles'
custody.333
However, the trial court expressly determined the statutory
presumption was rebutted.3 34 Charles had not directed violence
toward Kristofer or Trista and offered them a "more stable home
environment" than Wanda.3 05 Additionally, a bad relationship
existed between Wanda's older daughters and the two younger
children. 3 6
The supreme court stated domestic violence is an important
factor in considering the best interests of the children, 37 but other
factors are also important in a custody decision.338 In reviewing
the evidentiary record in this case, the court was satisfied that
proper consideration was given to domestic violence.3 39 Accord-
ing to the court, "[v]iolence or lack of violence toward the chil-
dren should not be ignored, but it would not be controlling. 3 40 As
such, the supreme court was not convinced that the trial court
made a mistake in finding that the statutory presumption against
awarding custody to the abusive parent was sufficiently rebutted
by credible evidence.3 4 1 Therefore, the court affirmed the trial
court's judgment, 42 noting that while the trial court's findings
"may not be crystal clear in defining which matters rebut the pre-
sumption, we do not interpret them as relying exclusively upon
lack of violence toward the children as sufficient. 31 43
for this factor over other statutory factors that the court is required to consider in deciding
the delicate issue of child custody." Id. at 511. "However, a failure to [consider domestic
violence] when there is 'credible evidence' of abuse could be a basis for reversal of [a trial
court's] judgment." Id.
332. Schestler, 486 N.W.2d at 511. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22(3) (1985); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1985).
333. Schestler, 486 N.W.2d at 512.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1985).
338. Schestler, 486 N.W.2d at 512.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 513.
343. Schestler, 486 N.W.2d at 512. Justice Levine vehemently dissented, arguing that
the statutory presumption "must be interpreted as giving domestic violence more weight in
656 [Vol. 69:627
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Blotske v. Leidholm
In Blotske v. Leidholm,344 a mother moved to regain custody
of her daughter after a trial court granted custody to the father.345
When Cindy Blotske and Russ Leidholm divorced in January
1988, Leidholm was granted custody of their two teenage daugh-
ters, Dawn and Michelle, while Blotske received custody of two-
year-old Jessica.346 In 1990, Leidholm moved to transfer Jessica's
custody to him but later dropped the motion.347 Both parents
remarried, and subsequently, Blotske moved from Bismarck to
Selfridge, North Dakota. 48  Leidholm, Dawn and Michelle filed
three separate complaints with Burleigh County Social Services in
the spring of 1991, alleging that Blotske's new husband sexually
abused Jessica and that Blotske neglected Jessica.349 The com-
plaints were found to be " 'unsubstantiated"' by a social services
team.350 In June 1991, Leidholm moved to change Jessica's cus-
tody to him.35 1  He amended the motion in September 1991,
custody disputes than the other statutory factors." Id. at 515. Justice Levine contended
that:
[i]t also must follow, that that the presumption (and the legislative intent fueling
it) must not be so trivialized that it can be overcome simply by evidence of other
statutory factors weighed in favor of the perpetrator because if that were the
case, the presumption would add nothing to the resolution of custody disputes.
Not only would this belie the legislative aversion to doing idle acts but it would
contradict our customary approach of giving meaning to every word in a statute.
So, I believe the majority seriously undermines, indeed, controverts, the
legislature's intent in creating the presumption, when the majority says that
domestic violence is but one factor to be considered along with other statutory
factors. In effect, the majority has repealed the enactment of the statutory
presumption. I simply am not sure what the trial court would have done had it
been correctly informed of the purpose and meaning of the amended statute. It
could not and, therefore, I assume, would not have found any ameliorating effect
from the fact that there was no violence against the children. It should, in light
of he presumption, give more weight to domestic violence than it gives to other
statutory factors .
I would reverse this case and remand it to the trial judge with the simple
instruction to do it over and do it right. I would request that he apply the statute
in the way it was intended by the legislature. Domestic violence is not just one
factor among many to be considered. It is the only factor blessed by a
presumption. The fact that Charles did not physically abuse the children does
not overcome the statutory presumption that it is not in the children's best
interests to have Charles, with his propensity for violence, as their custodian.
Indeed, in my view, the fact that Charles directed his physical abuse exclusively
at his wife is irrelevant. It is to protect the children from the ravages of domestic
violence committed against any family member that this statute is directed.
Id.
344. 487 N.W.2d 607 (N.D. 1992).
345. Blotske v. Leidholm, 487 N.W.2d 607, 608 (N.D. 1992).
346. Id. at 609.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Blotske, 487 N.W.2d at 609.
351. Id.
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requesting a regular fixed visitation schedule in the lieu of
changed custody.35 2
The district court ordered custody of Jessica transferred to
Leidholm, noting that several changed circumstances compelled a
finding that it was in Jessica's best interests to change her cus-
tody. 5 3 Blotske appealed, claiming that, in light of Jessica's best
interests, none of the changed circumstances required a change of
custody for Jessica. 5 4 Consequently, Blotske asserted that the dis-
trict court's order was clearly erroneous.3 55
The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that a party seeking
to change custody must prove that a significant change in circum-
stances has occurred.356 The changed circumstances must
adversely affect the child's best interests.3 5 7 The court also noted
that in a modification proceeding, the best interests of the child
must be balanced against "the stability of child's relationship with
the custodial parent.- 35 8
In this case, the changed circumstance found by the district
court was Blotske's interference with Leidholm's visitation. 9
The district court placed emphasis upon Leidholm's greater ability
to provide Jessica with love, affection and guidance. 360 However,
the court also found Jessica was healthy and happy and that she
loved her mother. 61
The supreme court determined that the district court made a
mistake by focusing on the potential advantages of Leidholm's
home instead of estimating the impact of removing Jessica from
352. Id.
353. Id. The district court utilized the factors listed in section 14-09-06.2 of the North
Dakota Century Code in determining whether the change in custody was in Jessica's best
interests. Id.
354. Id.
355. Blotske, 487 N.W.2d at 609.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 609 (citations omitted). The supreme court noted that there is an "aversion"
to changing custody of a well-adjusted child who has remained in the care of one parent for
a substantial amount of time. Id. at 609. The court noted that North Dakota case law
reflected "a preference for maintaining the custodial status quo by requiring a 'compelling'
or 'significant reason' before ordering a change of custody." Id. (citations omitted). The
court stated that:
[O]ne of the most beneficial byproducts of protecting custodial stability in
custody modification proceedings is its deterrent effect on continuous litigation
of custody which, left unchecked, generates cruel emotional and economic strain
on all participants to the ultimate detriment of a child's best interests. In any
change of custody proceeding, the important factor is the "stability of the child's
relationship with the custodial parent."
Id. (citations omitted).
359. Id. at 610.
360. Blotske, 487 N.W.2d at 610.
361. Id. at 611.
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her custodial relationship.36 2 The court noted that frustration of
visitation by itself does not constitute a sufficient change of circum-
stances to warrant modification in custody.363 The court stated
that "[b]efore a frustration of visitation problems justify changing
custody, there must be a finding that the visitation problems had
worked against the child's best interests. 36 4
The supreme court reversed and remanded, directing the dis-
trict court to develop a fair visitation schedule.365
Delzer v. Winn
In Delzer v. Winn,366 a father appealed from a judgment of a
district court changing custody of his two children to their
mother.36 7  The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, stating
that an improvement in the noncustodial parent's life does not
warrant a change of custody when the custodial parent is reason-
ably providing for the needs of the children.3 8
Following the divorce of Timothy and Shawna Delzer, cus-
tody of their two children was awarded to Timothy.369 Two years
later, Shawna petitioned the court for a modification of custody.3
Shawna admitted that she was immature and misguided at the
362. Id.
363. Id. at 610.
364. Id. The court found that in this case, while Blotske's efforts to frustrate visitation
had the effect of depriving Jessica of contact with loving family members, "that deprivation
is better remedied at first by resort to a more rigid visitation schedule, rather than a change
of custody." Id.
365. Blotske, 487 N.W.2d at 611. The court stated that to overcome the visitation
problems, the district court "should fashion an order that spells out a clear, specific and fair
visitation schedule." Id.
Justice VandeWalle concurred specially and while agreeing with the majority that
frustration of visitation by itself does not constitute a change in circumstance sufficient
enough to warrant a change in custody, he believed that a "continued pattern of
circumvention of visitation provisions may, in the appropriate case, 'weigh against the
child's best interests' such as to justify a change in custody." Id. at 612 (citations omitted).
VandeWalle stated, however, that "until a rigid visitation schedule is implemented, with
warning that any violations may result in a change in custody, the drastic remedy of a
change in custody is not warranted." Id. VandeWalle warned:
If that rigid visitation schedule is implemented and fails, either through
egregious violations or a pattern of less significant but continued violations, such
as to evidence an intransigent and contentious attitude toward the rights of the
noncustodial parent, I would affirm an order changing custody as a result of those
violations.
Id.
Chief Justice Erickstad reluctantly concurred in the result, opining that "the majority
... has over emphasized the importance we have previously accorded the continuity of the
custodial parent child relationship." Id. at 612-13.
366. 491 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1992).
367. Delzer v. Winn, 491 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1992).
368. Id. at 746-47.
369. Id. at 741.
370. Id.
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time of her divorce, but had since remarried and was completing
her nursing degree in South Dakota."' She maintained that she
could now provide the children with better educational, religious
and medical care than Timothy. 2 The district court found the
changes in Shawna's life equaled a significant change in circum-
stances, and the children's best interests would be served by
changing custody to Shawna3
Timothy appealed the modification of custody. 4 The North
Dakota Supreme Court stated that in a motion for modification, a
court must determine whether there has been a significant change
in circumstances since the divorce decree, and whether the
changes that have occurred necessitate changing custody to the
noncustodial parent for the best interests of the child. 75
The court noted that "[tihe improved circumstances in
Shawna's life do not lessen the good relationship Timothy has with
[the children]. The changed circumstances may enhance
Shawna's relationship with the children, but that alone does not
justify a change in custody. '3 76 The children were normal and
healthy and in a stable environment with their father.3  If the
district court had found evidence that living with Timothy was
negatively affecting the children, a modification of custody may
have been required.3 7 8 The supreme court noted that Shawna's
improved life may enhance her visits with the children, but it
alone did not justify a change of custody.379
The supreme court reversed the district court's judgment and
returned custody of the children to Timothy.38 °
371. Id.
372. Delzer, 491 N.W.2d at 742.
373. Id. at 742-43.
374. Id. at 743.
375. Id. (citations omitted).
376. Id. at 746.
377. Delzer, 491 N.W.2d at 746.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 747. Justice Levine concurred specially and asserted that the district court
failed to consider the importance of maintaining stability and continuity in the lives of the
children. Id. at 748. Justice Levine opined that there is an "'aversion"' to changing
custody of a well-adjusted child who has spent a significant amount of time with the
custodial parent. Id. at 747. Justice Levine stated that "there is a presumption of
maintaining the custody of a happy child with the custodial parent." Id. (emphasis added).
As such, Justice Levine further asserted that close cases should be resolved "in favor of
continuing the custody with the custodial parent in order to protect the desired continuity
of care as well as the desired predictability of and requiem from litigation arising from
custody judgments." Id.
Justice Meschke and Justice Johnson dissented, concluding that the majority
"discount[ed]" the findings of the trial court which found the custodial parent's efforts
deficient. Delzer, 491 N.W.2d at 749. Justice Johnson expressed his concern that the
majority was "intruding upon the role of the trial court in judging credibility and weighing
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FAMILY LAW-CHILD SUPPORT
Bergman v. Bergman
In Bergman v. Bergman, 3 8 a husband paying child support to
children from two separate marriages moved to reduce his sup-
port obligations.38 2
Gary Bergman was paying $225 a month in child support pay-
ments to one child from his first marriage and $525 a month to
three children from his second marriage.38 3 He brought separate
motions against both mothers to reduce the child support obliga-
tions, claiming that he had a substantial reduction in income.38 4
The trial court determined that his reduced income of $900 a
month constituted a material change of circumstances allowing
him to lower his child support obligation.38 5
The trial court looked to the North Dakota Department of
Human Services Child Support Guidelines and determined that an
individual with Gary's income had a support obligation of $324 per
month for four children. 86 The court divided $324 by four, allo-
cating each child $81 a month.387
Gary's first wife appealed, arguing that when there are two
separate families receiving payments from one obligor who owes a
duty of support, the first family should receive the first considera-
tion or priority under the guidelines.388 She contended that the
trial court should have determined the amount Gary owed for one
child under the guidelines, which was $207 a month.38 9 The $207
should have been deducted from his net income and the new
amount used to calculate what he owed for the three children
from the second family.39 o Using that calculation, Gary would
have owed $189 a month to his second family.3 9'
The supreme court recognized that the North Dakota Legisla-
ture "establishes a rebuttable presumption that the correct
the many nuances of the parties' presentations, personalities, and physical and emotional
demeanor . I..." d. at 749-50.
381. 486 N.W.2d 243 (N.D. 1992).
382. Bergman v. Bergman, 486 N.W.2d 243, 244 (N.D. 1992).
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. The trial court determined that Gary had suffered a forty-percent long-term
reduction in income through no fault of his own. Id.
386. Id.
387. Bergman, 486 N.W.2d at 244.
388. Id. at 245. Gary's first wife asserted that the child support guidelines recognize
"the first family's favored position." Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Bergman, 486 N.W.2d at 245.
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amount of child support is obtained by applying the child support
guidelines."39 2 However, in the instance where there is more than
one household to support, the guidelines should not be used exclu-
sively but should function as a preliminary starting point.393
The guidelines contain no schedule or table which addresses a
multifamily situation.394 In such an instance, the court must
decide the correct amount by balancing the needs of the children
and the ability of the obligor to pay.395 As the supreme court
noted,
[i]t is clear that the guidelines do not take into account
either multifamilies or the allocation of an obligor's
income among children of the obligor's multiple former
partners. The inequity of treating some children more
favorably, based upon the order of their birth or upon the
order of their appearance before the court, is obvious, but
it arises from the reality that, ordinarily, child support is
set in chronological order. The usual scenario is that the
first family's support is adjudicated, followed by the sec-
ond family, and so on. Here, we have a joinder of the two
families and an opportunity to achieve a more equitable
result.396
In analyzing the strict application of the child support guide-
lines in the instant case, the North Dakota Supreme Court con-
cluded that the guidelines "do not provide adequate guidance
when multiple families appear simultaneously before the trial
court. ' 397 Consequently, the supreme court reversed the judg-
ment of the district court and remanded for redetermination of
the child support obligation.398 The trial court was instructed to
use the guidelines for information, but to decide the amount based
on the child's needs, the ability of the parent to pay, and the
number of children in each household. 399
392. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09.7(3). The presumption may be rebutted by
evidence which establishes that factors exist that result in undue hardship to the supported
child or to the obligor which are not contemplated by the guidelines. Bergman, 486
N.W.2d at 245.
393. Id. at 247.
394. Id. at 246.
395. Id.
396. Bergman, 486 N.W.2d at 246.
397. Id. at 247.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 246-47. Justice Meschke concurred but asserted that a remand was
unnecessary. Id. at 247. He opined that "[w]hen there is not enough money for child
support, there is surely not enough for more litigation." Id. at 248. Meschke contended
that the shortage of financial contribution in the instant case should not be worsened with
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INJUNCTION
Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Lambs of Christ
In Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Lambs of Christ,40
abortion protesters appealed a preliminary injunction limiting
demonstrations outside an abortion clinic.40 '
The Fargo Women's Health Organization offers gynecological
medical services, including first trimester abortions. 40 2 Many
demonstrations by anti-abortion protesters have occurred in the
vicinity of the clinic.403 The demonstrations were generally
peaceful until March 1991.404 After that date, for approximately
seven months, the anti-abortion protesters allegedly committed
criminal and tortious acts against the abortion providers and their
patients.40 -5 The acts included impeding patients' access to the
clinic, breaking into the clinic, blocking public roads, and follow-
ing clinic staff members.40 6 The protesters also allegedly harassed
one of the clinic's doctors at her home, and placed leaflets on cars
at the school of the doctor's daughter.40 7
The clinic, its doctors and volunteers on behalf of themselves
and their patients sought injunctive relief against the protesters.40 8
The protesters named as defendants were individuals and several
unincorporated associations. 40 9 The plaintiffs submitted affidavits
detailing specific allegations of the defendant's behavior.41 0 In
response, the defendants denied many of the allegations but did
not offer any affidavits in support of their denial.411 The district
court granted a preliminary injunction for the clinic.41 2 The
protesters appealed, claiming "several specific provisions in the
injunction [were] unduly restrictive of their constitutional rights to
the expense of extra litigation. Id. Consequently, he urged for the application of the law of
the guidelines to the matter. Id. In conclusion, Meschke proclaimed that "Ujudicial
economy, too, suggests that the impoverished circumstances of these litigants not be
worsened by an ineffective remand." Id. Justice VandeWalle concurred in the result,
recognizing the practicality of Justice Meschke's special concurrence. See id. VandeWalle
asserted that Meschke's concurrence highlighted his concern over the procedure on appeal
in the instant matter. Id.
400. 488 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1992).
401. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Lambs of Christ, 488 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1992).
402. Id. at 404.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 404-05.
406. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc., 488 N.W.2d at 405.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 404.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc., 488 N.W.2d at 404.
412. Id. at 405.
1993] 663
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
free speech and assembly. 413
The protesters' first argument was that the preliminary
injunction was improper because it substituted a civil remedy for a
criminal process.414 They claimed that criminal law provided an
adequate remedy for the clinic.415 The injunction, the protesters
argued, impermissibly substituted a single judge for the protection
which the criminal justice system could have given the defend-
ants.4 16 However, the supreme court found that a court's power to
grant an injunction is valid even if the same acts are punishable as
a crime.417 Further, the clinic had offered enough evidence in its
affidavits to justify a preliminary injunction.4 18 The supreme court
concluded the district court properly granted the preliminary
injunction.4 19
The protesters also objected to many of the prohibitions in the
injunction, claiming the restrictions were not narrow enough to
meet constitutional analysis.420 First, the protesters argued that a
restriction which prohibited more than two demonstrators within
100 feet of clinic property lines during clinic hours was content-
based.42 ' The protesters claimed the restriction was content-
based because the purpose of the injunction was to silence expres-
sion of their pro-life views.4 ' The clinic argued the injunction was
content-neutral, because it needed to be protected from multiple
invasions of its rights.423 The supreme court agreed.424 The court
stated that the injunction was content-neutral because it was based
on a record of force, trespass and intimidation.425 Therefore, the
purpose of the injunction was to prohibit the method of communi-
cation and not the message itself.426
Next, the supreme court examined whether the regulation
limiting demonstrators was narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest.42 7 The court found that the government
had a significant interest in controlling the protesters' tortious con-
413. Id.
414. Id. at 406.
415. Id.
416. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc., 488 N.W.2d at 406.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 406-07.
421. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc., 488 N.W.2d at 407.
422. Id. at 408.
423. Id. at 407.
424. Id. at 408.
425. Id.
426. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc., 488 N.W.2d at 408.
427. Id. at 408.
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duct to protect the clinic's legal rights.42 8 The court stated that a
place regulation of limiting picketers could be an appropriate
method of regulating the tortious conduct. 429 However, the court
did not have a description of the physical layout of the clinic, and
thus had no way to determine whether the place restriction was
the proper one for the circumstances of the case.430 Therefore,
the picketing regulation was not narrow enough to satisfy constitu-
tional requirements. 43 1 The supreme court remanded the provi-
sion back to the trial court for revision to determine the necessary
zone of protection.432
Next, the protesters challenged a noise regulation in the
injunction.4 33 The noise restriction prohibited singing, yelling,
shouting or screaming which substantially interfered with the pro-
visions of medical services or obstructed the work of the clinic by
any means.434 The protesters argued the noise restriction was
vague.435 An injunction is vague if people of common intelligence
have to guess at its meaning.436 The protesters argued that the
phrase "obstructing the work" of the clinic was not understanda-
ble to a common citizen.437 However, the supreme court found
that the definition of "obstructing" was clear within the context of
the statute.43 8 It was making any noise which "'substantially
interferes with the provision of medical services.' 1439 There was
evidence in this case that the noise of the demonstrations pene-
trated most of the clinic.440 Therefore, according to the supreme
court, the provision could only be construed to prohibit excessive
441noise.
Next, the supreme court examined the constitutional vague-
ness of the noise restriction. 442 The court stated that the prohib-
ited noise in the injunction was measured by the impact on clinic
activities, 443 and that the noise had to be incompatible with the
428. Id. at 408-09.
429. Id. at 409.
430. Id.
431. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc., 488 N.W.2d at 409.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 407 n.iL
435. Id. at 409.
436. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc., 488 N.W.2d at 409.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 409-10.
441. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc., 488 N.W.2d at 410.
442. Id.
443. Id.
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provisions of medical services.444 Additionally, there had to be
causality between the noise and the interference. 445 Finally, in
order to support sanctions, the act had to be willfully done.446 All
of these provisions negated any vagueness in the restriction, and
therefore the noise restriction was not unconstitutionally vague." 7
Next, the protesters argued that a provision of the injunction
which prohibited demonstrators from harassing, intimidating or
physically abusing people associated with the clinic was constitu-
tionally vague.448 However, the supreme court found the clinic
had a prima facie claim of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress due to the extreme and outrageous conduct of the protes-
ters.449 The supreme court further found the protesters could not
argue that their lawful activities could be mistaken for harass-
ment.450 The harassment provision was therefore not unconstitu-
tionally vague.4 5'
Two other provisions of the injunction were challenged as
being overbroad by the protesters.45 2 The provisions prohibited
harassing, intimidating, following, photographing, videotaping and
speaking to staff and patients of the clinic.453 The supreme court
read the provisions to prohibit following, photographing and vide-
otaping patients and staff without their consent and done with the
intent to harass and intimidate.454 However, the court found that
the provisions were not clear and remanded the issue to the trial
court to modify the injunction in accordance with the supreme
court's instruction.4 55
The supreme court also held that speaking to the staff and
patients could not be constitutionally enjoined and removed that
part from the injunction.45 6 In the same context, a provision
which prohibited distribution of literature was struck from the
injunction.45 '7 The court recognized that a complete ban on dis-
tributing literature violated the First Amendment.458 Finally, the
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc., 488 N.W.2d at 410.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 410-11.
451. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc., 488 N.W.2d at 411.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Fargo Women's Health Org. Inc., 488 N.W.2d at 411.
457. Id.
458. Id.
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court upheld another part of the injunction which prohibited
physical abuse of people entering or exiting the clinic. 459 The
court reasoned that it would offer adequate protection from
protesters physically forcing literature on people. 460 The court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with its opinion.46'
INSURANCE
Ertelt v. EMCASCO Ins. Co.
In Ertelt v. EMCASCO Ins. Co.,462 Margaret Ertelt brought an
action seeking survivor benefits from her no-fault insurance car-
rier resulting from her husband's death.4 63 Ertelt's husband, John,
was alone in a grain field when his car caught .on fire.464 He ran
three-eighths of a mile to summon help from his son, who noticed
his dad was "out of breath, tired and visibly shaken. ,465 After they
ran back to the car to try to extinguish the fire, John collapsed and
suffered a fatal heart attack.466
Ertelt claimed survivor benefits from EMCASCO, her insur-
ance carrier, asserting that John died as a result of the car fire.467
EMCASCO denied the claim on grounds that the husband "had
not suffered an 'accidental bodily injury' while 'occupying' his car
as required for no-fault benefits. '468 The trial court found that
John was not occupying the car at the time of his heart attack and
was therefore not covered. 469 The court awarded summary judg-
ment in favor of EMCASCO.47 °
Ertelt appealed, contending her husband left the car because
it was on fire, and the stress surrounding the fire caused his
death.47 ' She also argued that she was entitled to benefits because
her husband's tremendous stress and subsequent heart attack
while occupying the vehicle during the fire was foreseeable.472
The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, stating that "'occu-
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc., 488 N.W.2d at 411.
462. 486 N.W.2d 233 (N.D. 1992).
463. Ertelt v. EMCASCO Ins. Co., 486 N.W.2d 233 (N.D. 1992).
464. Id.
465. Id. at 233-34.
466. Id. at 234.
467. Id.
468. Ertelt, 486 N.W.2d at 234.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id.
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pying' means 'to be in or upon a motor vehicle or engaged in the
immediate act of entering into or alighting from the motor vehi-
cle.' 473 The court defined accidental bodily injury as "'bodily
injury, sickness, or disease, including death resulting therefrom,
arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle.' ,,474 The court
stated that there was no evidence to suggest that the heart attack
arose "'out of the operation of a motor vehicle,'" or that it
occurred while John was occupying the vehicle.475 In fact, the rec-
ord showed John was at least fifteen to twenty feet away from the
car when he suffered the heart attack.476
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's determination of
summary judgment in EMCASCO's favor.477
JUVENILE LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Shirey v. B.S. (In re B.S.)
In Shirey v. B.S. (In re B.S.),478 the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that B.S., a juvenile, was denied the right to counsel
during an interrogation and that the trial court erred by not sup-
pressing certain testimony about what was said at the
interrogation.47 9
B.S. was questioned by police concerning his alleged involve-
ment in acts of vandalism and shoplifting.4 0 During the interro-
gation, B.S. did not have an attorney present, and he made
uncounseled admissions. 48 ' However, B.S.'s parents were present
during the interrogation, and it was explained to them that they
would be informed when they needed an attorney.48 2 The juve-
nile court declared B.S. to be a delinquent child in need of treat-
ment and ordered his temporary legal custody to be placed with
the Division of Juvenile Services of the North Dakota Department
of Corrections.4 83
B.S. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred by
allowing B.S.'s parents to testify as to the admissions B.S. made
473. Ertelt, 486 N.W.2d at 235 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-41-01(12)).
474. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-41-01(1)).
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. 496 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 1993).
479. Shirey v. B.S. (In re B.S.), 496 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 1993).
480. Id. at 32-33.
481. Id. at 32.
482. Id. at 33.
483. Id. at 32.
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during the uncounseled interrogation.484 The North Dakota
Supreme Court agreed with B.S., and reversed the juvenile court's
decision.485 The court noted that according to section 27-20-26 of
the North Dakota Century Code, an individual is entitled to have
counsel present at "all stages of any proceedings" which includes
an interrogation.486 The court stated:
If a minor is not represented by a parent, guardian or cus-
todian during an interrogation when the investigation has
focused upon him, he or she has a right to have an attor-
ney present, and that right cannot be waived. If, how-
ever, the minor is represented by a parent, guardian or
custodian during the interrogation, the minor has a right
to have an attorney present, but that right can be waived
if the waiver is knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
made.487
The court determined that B.S. did not waive his right to counsel
any time during the interrogation, therefore, his statutory rights
were violated by not having an attorney present.48 8
The court also determined that B.S. could not have been rep-
resented by his parents at the interrogation, because they were
"totally unfamiliar with the proceedings" and they did not under-
stand that it was their role to advise him at the interrogation.489
The court noted that B.S.'s parents were "misled" into thinking
that they did not need an attorney based on the officer's state-
ment.490 The court concluded that "under these circumstances
.. , [B.S.'s] right to an attorney at the interrogation was not waiv-
able and.., he was denied his right to counsel. ' 491 Additionally,
the court noted that B.S.'s uncounseled admissions were not
admissible against him to prove that he committed the acts with
484. In re B.S., 496 N.W.2d at 32.
485. Id. at 34. The scope of review "is equivalent to the former procedure of trial de
novo; we independently review the evidence presented to the juvenile court." Id.
486. Id. at 32. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (1985) (providing that "a party is
entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceedings . . ."). "The
'stages of any proceedings,' under this provision, are not limited to those instances which
take place in the courtroom but include circumstances, such as an interrogation, where the
officer has focused his investigation on a particular suspect and is intent on gathering
evidence." In re B.S., 496 N.W.2d at 32.
487. In re B.S., 496 N.W.2d at 32-33 (citations omitted).
488. Id. at 33.
489. Id. The court stated that"[t]he mere presence of a parent does not constitute
representation." Id.
490. Id. at 34.
491. Id. Even if it were assumed that B.S. was "represented" by his parents at the
interrogation, the totality of the circumstances indicated that there was no voluntary
waiver to the right to counsel. Id.
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which he was charged.492 Thus, his admissions were not admissi-
ble through his own testimony or through the testimony of others,
including his parents.493 Since the court could not find any valid
corroborative evidence to find B.S. guilty, the court reversed the
juvenile court's ruling.494
JUVENILE LAW-TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
In re Adoption of P.R.D.
In In re Adoption of P.R.D.,495 the North Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed a trial court's ruling terminating R.L.H.'s ("Rob-
ert") parental rights to P.R.D. ("Paul"). 496
Robert and S.O. ("Susan"), ages 16 and 18 respectively, are the
biological parents of Paul.49" During her pregnancy with Paul,
Susan decided to give the baby up for adoption, and subsequently
named David and Jean as the adoptive parents.498 Paul had been
in the custody of foster care or in the custody of the prospective
adoptive parents, D.L.D and J.M.D. ("David" and "Jean") since his
birth.49 9 David and Jean filed a petition for adoption and sought
termination of Robert's parental rights to Paul. 500 The trial court
determined that "Paul [was] a deprived child, that the deprivation
[was] likely to continue, and that ... Paul would probably suffer
serious mental or emotional harm." 50 1 The trial court entered a
judgment terminating Robert's parental rights.50 2  Robert
appealed.5 °3
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the relevant
North Dakota statutes essentially condense into a three-part test to
determine parental termination: "1) Is the child deprived? 2) Are
the conditions and causes of the deprivation likely to continue? 3)
Is the child suffering, or will the child in the future probably suffer,
492. In re B.S., 496 N.W.2d at 34. See N.D. CENT CODE § 27-20-27 (1991) (providing
that "extrajudicial statement[s], if obtained in the course of violation of this chapter ... may
not be used against [the admitting party]").
493. In re B.S., 496 N.W.2d at 34.
494. Id.
495. 495 N.W.2d 299 (N.D. 1993).
496. In re Adoption of P.R.D., 495 N.W.2d 299, 300 (N.D. 1993).
497. Id. Paul is the second child born to Robert and Susan. Id. Their first child, TJ.O.
("Thomas"), was adopted by David and Jean. Id.
498. Id. at 301. Susan signed a written consent to adoption pursuant to Chapter 14-
15.1 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id.
499. Id. at 300.
500. Id. at 301.
501. In re Adotion of P.R.D., 495 N.W.2d at 301.
502. Id.
503. Id.
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serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm?"' 504 The court
also noted that these three factors must be established by the party
seeking termination by clear and convincing evidence.50,
On appeal, Robert asserted that "the [trial] court erred in
finding that Paul [was] a deprived child, because Paul [had] at all
times received proper and appropriate care while in foster care
and while in the custody of David and Jean. ' 50 6 The court
rejected Robert's argument stating that Robert, who was currently
housed at a juvenile detention facility was a severely troubled
teenager510 Additionally, the court found Robert lacked the abil-
ity to care for an infant child and lacked the simplest parenting
skills.5 08 The court noted that the evidence clearly established
that the deprivation was likely to continue, and stated that "[t]he
record is replete with prognostic evidence about Robert's inability
to parent the child and the dim prospects for improvement in the
foreseeable future, irrespective of gender. 50 9
The court also found the evidence supported the trial court's
ruling that Paul probably would suffer emotional and mental harm
due to Robert's inability to parent during Paul's developmental
years.510 Robert contended that the trial court erred in not con-
sidering secondary sources, specifically his father and sister, who
could help him care for Paul. 51 1 The court rejected that argument
because of the family's inability to care for the child due to the
dysfunctional nature of Robert's family. 1 2
The court affirmed the trial court's judgment terminating
Robert's parental rights.5 1 3
LABOR RELATIONS
Hageman v. Park West Gardens
In Hageman v. Park West Gardens,1 4 a maintenance worker
sued an apartment complex for unpaid overtime.515
504. Id. at 301-302 (citations omitted). The relevant North Dakota statutes the court
considered are sections 14-15-19, 27-20-44 (lXb), and 27-20-02(5Xa) of the North Dakota
Century Code. Id. at 301.
505. Id. at 302.
506. In re Adoption of P.R.D., 495 N.W.2d at 302.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 302-03.
510. Id.
511. In re Adoption of P.R.D., 495 N.W.2d at 303.
512. Id. at 303-04.
513. Id. at 304.
514. 480 N.W.2d 223 (N.D. 1992).
515. Hageman v. Park West Gardens, 480 N.W.2d 223, 224 (N.D. 1992).
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Scott Hageman was hired in March of 1988 as a maintenance
laborer for the Park West Gardens, managed by Midwest Manage-
ment.516 Hageman's duties consisted of general maintenance of
the apartment complex, and electrical, plumbing, heating and air
conditioning repair.5 17 He was paid $7 per hour and received a
$10 per week gasoline allowance.518 Additionally, Hageman
received a $125 credit per month on the rental of his apartment at
Park West Gardens.51 9
Although Hageman usually used his own tools, Midwest sup-
plied Hageman with new tools when needed. 2 ° Midwest gave
Hageman a check with which Hageman purchased supplies each
month. 5 2 Hageman was also authorized to charge supplies at a
hardware store. 22 Hageman did not have set hours, but usually
went to the apartment office to pick up work orders at the same
time each day. 523 He also wore a voice pager on which he would
be contacted in case of an emergency.524 Hageman worked in this
manner for approximately two years.5 25
In 1990, Hageman sued the apartment complex and Midwest
Management for unpaid overtime compensation under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.5 26 He amended the claim two weeks later,
alleging discriminatory discharge under the Act.527 The trial court
found that "Hageman was an independent contractor and not an
employee for purposes of the Act" and dismissed Hageman's com-
plaint with prejudice. 28 Hageman appealed. 9
Hageman argued that the trial court misapplied the law of the
Fair Labor Standards Act with respect to covered employees.5 30
The supreme court agreed, stating the test of whether a worker is
an employee depends on the "economic reality" of the situa-
tion.531 The court noted that control over the work performed is
only one element of the economic reality of the worker. 32 Other
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Hageman, 480 N.W.2d at 224.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Id. at 225.
524. Id.
525. Hageman, 480 N.W.2d at 225.
526. Id. at 224. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq.
527. Hageman, 480 N.W.2d at 224.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id. at 225.
531. Id.
532. Hageman, 480 N.W.2d at 227.
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factors used to determine whether the economic reality of the
worker are the opportunity for profit or loss, the worker's invest-
ment in the business, the requirement for special work skills, the
permanency and duration of the work, and whether the worker is
an integral part of the employer's business.5 33
The supreme court noted that although Hageman was free to
decline work, a freedom to decline work does not demonstrate
economic independence.5 34 The court stated that if Hageman had
turned down work orders for Park West Gardens, he probably
would have lost his rental credit and the right to receive further
work orders.5 35 The supreme court stated that although Hageman
could have theoretically declined work; "Hageman actually
worked in a manner more consistent with a status of an employee
rather than the status of an independent contractor.- 536
The supreme court then examined the other "economic real-
ity" factors.537 The court found Hageman did not have a "real risk
of suffering any loss."53s Further, although Hageman used his own
tools for some of his work, the job was not contingent upon him
furnishing his own tools. 539 Therefore, Hageman was not required
to make an investment in his work for Park West Gardens.54 °
Additionally, although Hageman did possess technical skills,
"'[s]kills are not the monopoly of independent contractors.' "541
The court indicated that level of skill is relevant only if the worker
exploits her skills in order to obtain other work opportunities. 42
Hageman worked exclusively at Park West Gardens for two years
and became "dependent upon Park West Gardens/Midwest Man-
agement for his continued employment as well as his livelihood.5 43
The supreme court thus determined that Hageman was an
employee rather than an independent contractor.5 44
Since Hageman was an employee, he was entitled to protec-
tion under the Fair Labor Standards Act.545 The Act prohibits ter-
mination of an employee which is motivated in part by an
533. Id. at 226.
534. Id. at 228.
535. Id.
536. Id. (emphasis in original)
537. Hageman, 480 N.W.2d at 228-31.
538. Id. at 228.
539. Id. at 229.
540. Id.
541. Id. (quoting Secretary of Labor, Dept. of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1537
(7th Cir. 1987)).
542. Hageman, 480 N.W.2d at 229.
543. Id. at 230.
544. Id. at 231.
545. Id. at 225.
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employee's assertion of any rights under the Act.54 The trial
court found that Hageman's termination was not retaliatory and
therefore not a wrongful discharge under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act.547 However, the supreme court determined that the
trial court may have based that finding upon the erroneous conclu-
sion that Hageman was an independent contractor rather than an
employee. 48
The court remanded the case on the issue of discriminatory
termination, and directed the trial court to address the issues of
liquidated damages and attorney's fees, as well as the issue of
whether or not the employment was in interstate commerce.5 4 9
Loss OF CONSORTIUM
Butz v. World Wide, Inc.
In Butz v. World Wide, Inc., 5° the defendants appealed a
damages award for loss of spousal consortium.55 1 The North
Dakota Supreme Court held that in the future claims for loss of
consortium must be joined with the underlying action of the
impaired spouse and that no cause of action exists in North Dakota
for loss of parental consortium. 5 2
Charles Butz, Jr. was awarded damages in excess of $500,000
in a personal injury action against World Wide, Inc. and Cass Oil
Co. (World Wide) for injuries he sustained in a boating accident.5 3
Approximately three years after the entry of the jury verdict,
Charles' wife, Rose, and children brought loss of consortium
actions against World Wide. 54 The trial court awarded Rose
$30,000 in damages for loss of spousal consortium and dismissed
the children's claim for loss of parental consortium.555 World
Wide appealed Butz's damages award, and the children cross-
appealed the dismissal of their claim.556
World Wide argued that in North Dakota, "[a] claim for loss of
consortium must mandatorily be joined with the original personal
546. Id. at 231.
547. Hageman, 480 N.W.2d at 232.
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. 492 N.W.2d 88 (N.D. 1992).
551. Butz v. World Wide, Inc., 492 N.W.2d 88 (N.D. 1992).
552. Id. at 91-92.
553. Id. at 88-89.
554. Id. at 89.
555. Id.
556. Butz, 492 N.W.2d at 89.
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injury action, or thereafter be barred. '5 5 7 World Wide thus con-
tended that since Butz had filed her motion separate from her hus-
band's underlying personal injury action, her claim should have
been dismissed.
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that joinder
should be required in loss of consortium claims. 5 8 The court ruled
that if a deprived party does not join a claim, the party must give
the court a compelling reason for not doing so or the claim will be
dismissed with prejudice. 5 9 If there is no compelling reason for
failing to join a claim, there will be an absolute bar to any loss of
consortium claim attempted after the conclusion of the underlying
case.
56 0
The court did not apply the new joinder requirement in this
case since there was no established binding precedent in North
Dakota which would have required Butz to join her consortium
claim with her husband's personal injury claim.561 Therefore,
Butz's damages due to loss of spousal consortium were upheld, and
the court held that the compulsory joinder rule should be imple-
mented prospectively. 562
The Butz children contended that North Dakota precedent
prohibiting actions for loss of parental consortium should be over-
turned because of a trend expanding the spectrum of loss for con-
sortium claims.563 The supreme court disagreed, stating that
"'the birth of the child's cause of action for loss of parental consor-
tium should be attended to by the Legislature as its
obstetrician.' ",564
557. Id.
558. Id. at 91. The court stated that loss of consortium claims should be joined with the
underlying personal injury action whenever feasible because:
"[T]he most efficient way to preclude double-recovery problems is to require
that the loss-of-consortium action be joined, whenever possible, with the
impaired spouse's cause of action. Joinder of these related claims will also reduce
litigation expenses for the parties, conserve judicial time and resources, and
contribute a bit to the reduction of court congestion."
Id. (quoting Brown v. Metzger, 470 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Ill. 1984)).
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Butz, 492 N.W.2d at 92.
562. Id.
563. Id. at 93.
564. Id. at 93-94 (quoting Morgel v. Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266, 267 (N.D. 1980)). The
court adhered to the vitality of the ten reasons, originally set forth in 69 A.L.R.3d 528 and
later superseded by 11 A.L.R.4th 549, for denying children a cause of action for loss of
parental consortium. Id. at 93. Those reasons are:
"(1) the absence of any enforceable claim on the child's part to the parent's
services, (2) the absence of precedents, (3) the uncertainty and remoteness of
damages involved, (4) the possible overlap with the parent's recovery, (5) the
multiplication of liti gation, (6) the possibility of upsetting settlements made with
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The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the district
court.5 6 5
MASTER AND SERVANT
McLean v. Kirby Co.
In McLean v. Kirby Co., the Kirby Company appealed from a
judgment awarding damages to a woman who was raped by a
Kirby salesman. 566
Linda McLean was assaulted and raped by Michael Molachek
after she let him into her apartment to demonstrate a Kirby vac-
uum cleaner.567 Molachek was hired by William Urie, who owned
University Vacs, Inc., which did business as Kirby Co. of Fargo-
Moorhead, Inc.5 8 McLean sued Molachek, Urie, and Kirby.56 9
Molachek did not appear in the action, and Urie settled with
McLean before trial.S7 0 The jury found Urie seventy percent neg-
ligent and Kirby thirty percent negligent based upon a peculiar
risk doctrine.571 The amount assessed against Kirby in damages
was $150,000, with no exemplary damages awarded to McLean.5 72
Kirby appealed on several grounds, and McLean cross-
appealed, contending the trial court erred in instructing the jury
on her claim for punitive damages.5 7 3
Kirby's first argument to the North Dakota Supreme Court
parents, (7) the danger of fabricated actions, (8) the increase in insurance costs,
(9) the public policy expressed in some jurisdictions on the enactment of 'heart
balm' statutes, and (10) family problems arising from segregated awards to
children."
Id. at 93 n.4.
565. Id. at 94. Justice VandeWalle concurred specially to agree with the majority that
"the Legislature should enact legislation establishing a child's cause of action for loss of
parental consortium if such a cause of action is to be created." Id. However, Justice
VandeWalle disagreed that the ten reasons specified in the annotation at 64 A.L.R.3d 528
and restated in 11 A.L.R.4th 549 "are necessarily reasons why the Legislature should not
adopt a cause of action for loss of parental consortium." Id. Justice Vandewalle, although
adhering to the belief that it is the province of the legislature to establish such a cause of
action, opined:
When juxtaposed against the right of parents to recover for loss of consortium of
their child, the lack of a concurrent cause of action for loss of parental
consortium is reminiscent of a time and practice not to be emulated when
children were considered chattels, the property of the parents, their prime
purpose to produce income and provide for the parents.
Id.
566. 490 N.W.2d 229 (N.D. 1992).
567. McLean v. Kirby Co., 490 N.W.2d 229 (N.D. 1992).
568. Id.
569. Id.
570. Id. at 232.
571. Id. See Restatement (2d) of Torts § 413 (1965).
572. McLean, 490 N.W.2d at 232.
573. Id. at 232-33.
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was that McLean had failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.5 74 However, the supreme court found that
Kirby owed McLean a duty of care, since the circumstances were
such that there was a foreseeable risk of harm to potential custom-
ers.5 75 If Kirby had required its distributors to investigate poten-
tial dealers before hiring them, Kirby could have reduced or
eliminated the risk of harm to potential customers; but it had
not.576 Therefore, the court held that the work done on behalf of
Kirby involved a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm as a
matter of law.577
Kirby argued next that Urie was an independent contractor,
and employers are not responsible for the acts of independent con-
tractors. 578 The court determined that a peculiar unreasonable
risk of physical harm was created by Kirby since it placed sales
members into homes without taking reasonable precautions. 79
The peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm is a valid excep-
tion to the independent contractor doctrine, which did not allow
Kirby to escape liability for Urie's acts.580
The supreme court noted Kirby employed independent con-
tractors to hire people and provided them with access to homes on
Kirby's behalf.5 1 Additionally, Kirby, not the independent con-
tractor, had special knowledge of the peculiar risks to potential
customers. 8 2 Therefore, the court concluded the work done on
behalf of Kirby by the independent contractors involved a pecu-
liar unreasonable risk of physical harm as a matter of law.58 3
Kirby argued it could not foresee that the work assigned to
the independent contractor would create a peculiar unreasonable
risk of physical harm.5 4 However, the supreme court stated that a
foreseeable risk of harm exists for an occupant if an employer
allows an employee to enter a home without first investigating the
employee.58 5 The same risk of harm is foreseeable to those who
hire independent contractors to employ workers and provide
574. Id. at 233.
575. Id. at 234.
576. Id.
577. McLean, 490 N.W.2d at 235.
578. Id. at 234.
579. Id. at 235.
580. Id.
581. Id. at 238.
582. McLean, 490 N.W.2d at 236.
583. Id.
584. Id. at 236-37.
585. Id. at 238.
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them with access to homes on the employer's behalf.5 8 The occu-
pant of a dwelling is subject to the foreseeable risk of harm "unless
special precautions are taken.158 7 Kirby had particularized knowl-
edge that the risk of harm was foreseeable, since Kirby was aware
that rape had been committed by Kirby dealers in customer's
homes.5ss Kirby also had a dealer application form that inquired
about criminal convictions.589 The supreme court found a ques-
tion about criminal convictions on an application form was evi-
dence of knowledge of a risk.590 The supreme court concluded
that Kirby had particularized knowledge from which a jury could
infer foreseeability. 59 1 The court also found that there was a fore-
seeable risk of harm to customers from Kirby dealers whose back-
grounds were not investigated for fitness.59 2
Kirby's next argument was that the trial court did not rule
that Kirby owed a special duty to the plaintiff as a matter of law.593
Kirby also contended that the trial court did not submit factual
issues to the jury upon which they could have made a finding of a
duty.59 4 Kirby had requested two detailed special verdict inter-
rogatories.59 5 Nonetheless, the trial court only submitted a special
verdict asking if Kirby was negligent, and if the negligence was a
proximate cause of McLean's damages. 5 6 The trial court also
instructed the jury on foreseeability and peculiar unreasonable
risk.597 The supreme court stated the trial court had broad discre-
tion over the special verdict interrogatories and did not abuse its
discretion in submitting the interrogatories.5 9 8
Kirby also argued that it did not breach a duty to McLean
under the peculiar unreasonable risk of harm doctrine. 99 Under
this doctrine, an employer who hires an independent contractor is
not liable if the employer specifies that the contractor shall take
special precautions.600 In the present case, the supreme court
found that the relevant parts of Kirby's distributorship agreement
586. Id.
587. McLean, 490 N.W.2d at 238.
588. Id. at 238-39.
589. Id. at 239.
590. Id.
591. Id.
592. McLean, 490 N.W.2d at 239.
593. Id.
594. Id. at 240.
595. Id.
596. Id.
597. McLean, 490 N.W.2d at 240.
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Id.
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did not impose a duty upon the contractors to take any special pre-
cautions against hiring dangerous individuals. 60 ' The court also
also found that Kirby provided no recommendations, training or
policies to its independent contractors to instruct them on inter-
viewing applicants regarding their background or screening of the
applicants.60 2 Based upon all these facts, the supreme court con-
cluded McLean had stated a claim upon which relief could be
granted.6 °3
Kirby's next contention was that Molachek's criminal act was a
superseding cause of McLean's injury.60 4 The supreme court dis-
agreed, finding that Kirby and Urie created the opportunity for
Molachek's criminal act by their original negligence.60 5 The court
stated a jury could have reasonably found that McLean would not
have admitted Molachek to her apartment unless he identified
himself as a Kirby salesman.60 6
Kirby also argued that the trial court's ruling that Molachek's
fault would not be compared to the fault of Kirby and Urie was in
error.60 7 Kirby contended that the jury should have assigned rela-
tive percentages of fault to Molachek, Kirby and Urie in order to
determine the amount owed to McLean by Kirby.60 8 The
supreme court disagreed. 60 9 The application of comparative cau-
sation was designed for products liability cases. 61 0 The court
stated the negligence of Kirby and Urie allowed Molachek into
Mclean's apartment enabling him to rape her.61' The court deter-
mined McLean's recovery should not be diminished by Molachek's
actions, since Molachek committed the crime as a result of Kirby
and Urie's negligence.61 2
Kirby's last argument was that there was insufficient evidence
to find that an act or omission of Kirby was the proximate cause of
McLean's injuries.61 3 The supreme court disagreed.61 4 The court
found that there was substantial evidence to support the verdict
because Kirby took no steps to minimize the risk of harm to poten-
601. Id. at 240-41.
602. McLean, 490 N.W.2d at 241-42.
603. Id. at 242.
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Id. at 243.
607. McLean, 490 N.W.2d at 243.
608. Id. at 244.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Id.
612. McLean, 490 N.W.2d at 244.
613. Id. at 245.
614. Id.
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tial customers.61 5
Finally, McLean appealed the jury's denial of punitive dam-
ages.61 6 She claimed that the trial court should have given an
instruction defining reckless disregard. 17 McLean also asserted
that the trial court erred in its instruction requiring clear and con-
vincing evidence as the burden of proof for punitive damages
rather than a preponderance of the evidence. 8
The trial court's instructions provided that it could award
punitive damages if the defendant acted with oppression or mal-
619 oice. Part of the definition of malice was "reckless disregard of
another's rights. '62 0 The supreme court stated that the trial court
could have defined reckless disregard if it felt such a definition
were necessary, but it was not error to fail to do so. 6 1' The
supreme court also disagreed with McLean's burden of proof argu-
ment.6 22 The court determined there was not sufficient evidence
for a jury to find conduct by Kirby which would justify a punitive
damages award.623 Punitive damages are not awarded on a find-
ing of mere negligence.62 4 The supreme court affirmed the judg-
ment of the trial court.6 25
NEGLIGENCE
Holter v. City of Sheyenne
The parents of a child who was killed while attempting to
cross a highway after leaving a Tastee Freez brought a wrongful
death action against the property owner and the city in Holter v.
City of Sheyenne.626 The Holters' ten-year-old daughter had
played video games and bought candy at the Tastee Freez. 27 She
left the store and attempted to walk across U.S. Highway 281,
which is also Sheyenne's main street.628 A parked vehicle alleg-
edly obstructed the view of Dennis Ulmer, who struck the girl as
615. Id.
616. Id.
617. McLean, 490 N.W.2d at 245.
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. Id.
621. Id. at 246.
622. McLean, 490 N.W.2d at 246.
623. Id. at 247.
624. Id. at 246.
625. Id. at 247.
626. 480 N.W.2d 736 (N.D. 1992).
627. Holter v. City of Sheyenne, 480 N.W.2d 736 (N.D. 1992).
628. Id. at 737.
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she ran out onto the highway. 2 9
The Holters claimed that the Tastee Freez owed a duty of
care to their daughter. 63 0 They alleged that the duty extended
beyond the Tastee Freez premises to the highway where she was
hit.631 According to the Holters, the Tastee Freez breached its
duty by failing to warn of the dangers of crossing the highway and
by failing to request the City of Sheyenne to restrict parking in
front of the premises.6 32 They also argued that the duty of care
owed to minors was greater than the duty to adults since the Tas-
tee Freez was especially attractive to minors.633
The supreme court found that the Tastee Freez had no con-
trol over the property where the injury occurred, and therefore
had no duty to the deceased child. 34 The court stated that the girl
was injured on a public highway by a vehicle over which the Tas-
tee Freez had no control.635 The court declared that, generally,
an owner of commercial premises owes no duty to a patron who is
struck on a public roadway adjacent to its premises, especially
when the owner has no control over the situs of the accident or the
"instrumentality causing the injury.- 636
According to the court, Tastee Freez did not owe a special
duty of care to minors. 637 The Holters argued that Tastee Freez
owed a special duty of care to minors by analogizing Tastee Freez
to mobile vendors selling products such as ice cream on the
street.638 The court distinguished the mobile vendors from Tastee
Freez because Tastee Freez was a permanent establishment
which did not beckon children into the store. 39
The Holters claimed the city was negligent in its failure to
provide safety devices which would have allowed pedestrians to
cross the highway safely. 640 They also claimed that the city negli-
gently failed to prohibit parallel parking between the highway and
the Tastee Freez.641 The court agreed with the city, stating that
the city was not in control of regulations on the highway, and it
629. Id.
630. Id.
631. Id. at 738.
632. Holter, 480 N.W.2d at 738.
633. Id. at 739.
634. Id. at 738.
635. Id.
636. Id.
637. Holter, 480 N.W.2d at 740.
638. Id. at 739.
639. Id. at 740.
640. Id.
641. Id.
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therefore had no duty of care.642
North Dakota cities have only limited control over urban
streets that connect with state highways.643 The state Department
of Transportation has control over all devices on highways such as
the one in question.1 4 As a result, Sheyenne had no authority to
act on such matters without the Department's approval. 45 Since
Sheyenne had no authority to act, it owed no duty of care to the
deceased child.646
The supreme court affirmed the district court's determination
of summary judgment dismissing the parents' claim.647
Jones v. Ahlberg
In Jones v. Ahlberg,648 the parents of an automobile passenger
killed during a high-speed police chase brought a wrongful death
action against the officers and their employers.649 The North
Dakota Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of under
what circumstances law enforcement officials and their employers
may be held accountable when the pursuit of a criminal suspect
results in the death or injury of someone other than the suspect. 5 °
The supreme court held that law enforcement officials and their
employers may be held liable for injury to others which results
from the pursuit of a criminal suspect "when the officer's conduct
in initiating or continuing the pursuit constitutes gross negligence
evincing a reckless disregard for the safety of others."6 51
Linda Jones was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Dennis
Sampson.65 Lewis Ahlberg, a Langdon police officer, stopped
Sampson after observing Sampson's vehicle cross the center line
several times.65 3 After Sampson failed field sobriety tests and was
arrested, Officer Ahlberg opened the driver's door to Sampson's
car to talk to the passenger, Jones. 54 Suddenly Sampson, who was
not handcuffed, pushed the officer aside, jumped into the driver's
642. Holter, 480 N.W.2d at 740.
643. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-01-03.
644. Holter, 480 N.W.2d at 741.
645. Id.
646. Id.
647. Id. at 241-42.
648. 489 N.W.2d 576 (N.D. 1992).
649. Jones v. Ahlberg, 489 N.W.2d 576, 578 (1992).
650. Id.
651. ld.
652. Id.
653. Id.
654. Jones, 489 N.W.2d at 578.
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seat of his vehicle, and sped off. 55
The subsequent chase continued for 60 miles through three
counties at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour, and involved
eleven different police units.65 6 Eventually a highway patrolman
pulled in front of Sampson's vehicle, attempting to stop Samp-
son. 5 7 Instead of stopping, Sampson tried to pass the highway
patrol vehicle on the shoulder of the road. 8  Sampson's car col-
lided with the patrol vehicle and rolled. 59 Jones, the passenger,
died of injuries she received in the rollover.660
In their wrongful death action against the law enforcement
officers and their employers, the trial court awarded Jones' parents
$232,831.15."' The defendants appealed, asserting that the trial
court should have applied a reckless disregard standard rather
than a simple negligence standard in determining liability.662
The supreme court reversed and remanded for a new trial
because the trial court did not clearly state the standard of liability
it used.663 The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that North
Dakota statutes do not provide a liability standard for a police
chase resulting in death or injury. 64 The court construed several
statutes together and held that the appropriate standard of liability
is gross negligence.66 5
In order for a law enforcement official's conduct to rise to the
level of gross negligence, his or her conduct in pursuing a suspect
-must manifest a mental attitude of indifference that evinces a
reckless disregard toward the safety and well being of others." 66 6
To determine whether officers are grossly negligent in initiating or
continuing a pursuit, a court must consider "the reason(s) for pur-
suing the fleeing vehicle, the nature of the suspected law violation,
the speed and duration of the pursuit, the weather and road condi-
tions, the presence of innocent passengers or pedestrians, and the
655. Id.
656. Id.
657. Id. at 578-79.
658. Id. at 579.
659. Jones, 489 N.W.2d at 579.
660. Id.
661. Id. at 578.
662. Id. at 579.
663. Id.
664. Jones, 489 N.W.2d at 579.
665. Id. at 580-81. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-06-13, 32-12.1-03, 32-12.1-04, 39-09-
06, 39-10-03. In construing these statutory provisions, the North Dakota Supreme Court
concluded that the statutes manifested a legislative intent to hold law enforcement officials
responsible for their actions in pursuing suspected violators of the law, but found that "a
higher standard than simple negligence applies." Jones, 489 N.W.2d at 581.
666. Id.
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presence of other traffic in the area." '667
The defendants also argued that the officers' pursuit was not
the proximate cause of the accident and Jones' death.66 8 The court
stated that proximate cause is a question for the factfinder that will
be overturned on appeal only if the finding is clearly erroneous.669
The court thus agreed with the reasoning of other courts which,
under similar factual circumstances, have concluded that the ques-
tion of proximate cause must be decided by a factfinder since rea-
sonable persons could disagree on the question.6
Finally, the defendants argued that the trial court should have
attributed a percentage of fault to Sampson, even though Sampson
was not a party in the action since he had settled with the Jones
family.67 1 The supreme court agreed, stating that a reasonable
person would not disagree that Sampson's conduct was a proxi-
mate cause of Jones' death. 72
The court reversed and remanded. 3
Madler v. McKenzie County
In Madler v. McKenzie County,67 4 the North Dakota Depart-
ment of Transportation (hereinafter DOT) contracted with
McKenzie county to help supervise the construction of a bridge
within its borders. 675 The DOT also contracted with Edward H.
Schwartz Construction (hereinafter Schwartz), with whom Plain-
tiff Madler was employed, to construct the bridge. 6  While work-
ing on the construction project, Madler was seriously injured when
he fell from a scaffolding. Madler sued the county, alleging that
it had failed to provide a safe workplace, and thus, breached a duty
that it owed to him.6 7 8 The trial court ordered summary judgment
in favor of the county.6 79 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme
667. Id.
668. Id.
669. Jones, 489 N.W.2d at 581.
670. Id. at 582.
671. Id. at 583.
672. Id. at 583.
673. Id. at 584.
674. 496 N.W.2d 17 (N.D. 1993).
675. Madler v. McKenzie, 496 N.W.2d 17, 18 (N.D. 1993). The defendant was to
provide "'adequate engineering, supervision, and inspection' for the project and to
maintain the bridge after completion of construction." Id.
676. Id.
677. Id. Safety nets, safety lines, or guardrails were not used with this construction
project. Id.
678. Id. The plaintiff also alleged that the scaffold on which he was standing when he
fell violated state and federal safety regulations. Id.
679. Id.
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Court reversed and remanded for determination of the issue of
duty of care.6 0
On remand, the trial court refused to find, as Madler argued, a
duty of care, as a matter of law, on the county based on 23 C.F.R.
section 635.105(d) and thus submitted the issue to the jury.68 1 The
jury determined that the county was not negligent, and Madler's
claims were dismissed.682
In his second appeal, Madler contended that "the trial court
erred in refusing to rule that the county had a duty, as a matter of
law, to provide for [his] safety. 6 81 3 However, the North Dakota
Supreme Court stated that Madler's contention rested upon a
reading of only a portion of the statute (subsection (d)) and that
"[s]tatutes... must be construed as a whole to determine their
intent, deriving the intent by comparing every section as a part of
a whole. '684 The court found that when subsection (d) is read in
the context of the entire statute it does not impose a duty on the
defendant.685 The court stated that subsection (d) "applies only
when the county performs the work itself or lets the contract for
the project. ' 6 6  The county, however, did not do either task.
"[The] DOT entered into the contract with Schwartz to construct
the bridge. The county's involvement came after-the-fact, in a
subsequent contract to provide engineering, supervision and
inspection of the project. '6 7 The court also rejected Madler's
contention that the "in responsible charge and direct control" lan-
guage of subsection (d) created a duty of care.688 The court again
recognized that when subsection (d) is read in context with the
other provisions of the statute it "do[es] not... satisfy the 'retained
control' requirement of section 414 of the Restatement [(Second)
of Torts]."6 89
680. Madler, 496 N.W. 2d at 18-19. The basis for the county's summary judgment
motion rested on the assertion that it owed no duty of care for the plaintiff's safety. Id.
681. Id. at 19.
682. Id.
683. Id. Madler argued that 23 C.F.R. § 635.105(d) "required the County to be 'in
responsible charge and direct control' of the bridge construction project and, therefore,
created a duty, as a matter of law .... Id.
684. Id. at 20. Subsection (d) provides in part that:
the State highway agency shall provide a full-time State employed engineer to
be in responsible charge and direct control of the project at all times. In those
instances where a city or county can justify the use of consultants for these
services, the city or county shall have a similar duty."
Id.
685. Madler, 496 N.W.2d at 21.
686. Id.
687. Id.
688. Id.
689. Id. at 22.
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The supreme court also rejected Madler's contention that the
trial court erred in allowing employees of the county and the DOT
"to testify as to their interpretations or opinions of state or federal
law."'690 The court stated that the basis of Madler's assertion was
that a duty was owed to him under the statute; therefore, Madler
was contending that any testimony inconsistent with that duty was
inadmissible.691 The court noted that since no duty was owed as a
matter of law, the testimony was relevant evidence as to the intent
of the parties to the contract.692 Finally, Madler argued that the
trial court's refusal to give his requested jury instructions consti-
tuted reversible error. 9 a The court noted that it had reviewed
the entire set of instructions and in its opinion, the instructions
adequately informed the jury of the law.694
The trial court's judgment was affirmed. 95
SCHOOL-TERMINATION
Kent v. Sawyer Pub. Sch. Dist. 16
In Kent v. Sawyer Pub. Sch. Dist. 16,696 Kent brought an
action against the school district alleging wrongful nonrenewal of
her contract as well as sex discrimination in not rehiring her for a
vacancy.697 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
school board did not abuse its discretion in its nonrenewal of
Kent's contract and that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding of sexual discrimination.698
Faced with declining enrollment and serious budget con-
straints and deficits, Sawyer Public School District 16 (hereinafter
the District) decided to combine the second and third grades,
thereby eliminating one elementary teacher.699 After an evalua-
tion of all the elementary teachers in the District, the Superinten-
dent recommended that Kent's contract should not be
690. Madler, 496 N.W.2d at 22.
691. Id.
692. Id. at 22-23. The court stated:
The testimony Madler challenges is not opinion or interpretation of state or
federal law, nor is it evidence of a custom or usage which is contradictory to or
inconsistent with state or federal law. The challenged testimony is more aptly
characterized as the County and DOT representatives' understanding of the
allocation of safety responsibilities, including custom and usage, under various
contractual provisions." Id. at 23.
693. Id.
694. Id.
695. Madler, 496 N.W.2d at 23.
696. 484 N.W.2d 287 (N.D. 1992).
697. Kent v. Sawyer Pub. Sch. Dist. 16, 484 N.W.2d 287 (N.D. 1992).
698. Id. at 289.
699. Id. at 288.
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renewed. 70 0 Kent was then granted a hearing by the school board
which voted not to renew Kent's teaching contract.70 ' Subse-
quent to the board's decision for nonrenewal, a teaching position
opened up in early fall, and the District sought a teacher who
could both teach and coach.7 °2 Kent was not considered for the
open position due to her lack of training and experience.70 3 As a
result, Kent brought suit against the District for wrongful dismissal
and for sex discrimination, alleging that combining the teaching
and coaching position was "an obvious effort to exclude" her. 0
The trial court found that the District's actions were "proper" and
dismissed Kent's complaints.70 5
On appeal, Kent argued that the Superintendent used
improper criteria in his determination by considering factors other
than "adaptability," which is the only relevant criterion stated in
the written policy of the District.7 6 The North Dakota Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court that section 15-47-38 of the
North Dakota Century Code neither specifies which criteria must
be used when comparing teachers, nor that the school board give
reasons why it has selected one teacher over another in financially
motivated staff reductions.70 7 The court determined that the
school board had sufficient information about Kent's qualifications
to make a reasonable, good faith decision as to Kent's nonre-
newal.7 ° s The court further determined that the board did not act
arbitrarily in not renewing Kent's contract since it followed its
own policy and properly applied the statutory procedure.70 9
The court also agreed with the trial court's dismissal of Kent's
sex discrimination claim.710 The court rejected Kent's claim based
on a lack of merit because Kent did not present sufficient evidence
of disparate treatment or of disparate impact to support her
claim.7 1'
700. Id.
701. Id.
702. Kent, 484 N.W.2d at 288.
703. Id.
704. Id. at 288-89.
705. Id. at 289.
706. Id. The other six criteria the Superintendent considered were academic
preparation, teacher evaluation, extra curricular assignments, health and attendance,
contribution to school, and seniority. Id.
Kent was evaluated based on school records of her performance qualities since the
superintendent, who was new to the district, had no personal knowledge of her teaching
performance. Id.
707. Kent, 484 N.W.2d at 289. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-38.
708. Kent, 484 N.W.2d at 289 (N.D. 1992).
709. Id. at 290.
710. Id. at 291.
711. Id.
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The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.712
SOCIAL SECURITY
Hulse v. Job Serv. North Dakota
In Hulse v. Job Serv. North Dakota,7 13 Barry Hulse appealed
the denial of unemployment compensation benefits.71 The North
Dakota Supreme Court held that his utterance of an expletive did
not constitute "benefit-disqualifying 'misconduct.' "715
Hulse worked as a child care worker for about two and half
years at the Dakota Boys Ranch Association.7 16 Hulse became
frustrated with an uncooperative resident one evening.717 Believ-
ing he was alone in the kitchen, Hulse muttered an expletive
under his breath, intending that it be heard by no one.718 Unex-
pectedly, however, another resident overheard Hulse's remark
and told the uncooperative resident what Hulse had muttered.71 9
Hulse attempted to apologize, but the resident became very upset
and eventually filed a complaint against Hulse.72 °
712. Id. Although Justice VandeWalle concurred with the majority opinion, he wrote
separately to convey his uneasiness with respect to the subsequent opening that arose and
for which the school board determined that Kent was not qualified, because it was coupled
with coaching. Id. Justice VandeWalle's concern was previously expressed in a similar case
in which he stated:
"I believe that in the future, school boards which do not renew a teacher's
contract because of financial distress but create other full-time or part-time
positions for which a nonrenewed teacher is qualified should 'go to the last mile'
and affirmatively offer the nonrenewed teacher the newly created position.
Such affirmative action on the part of the school board will be persuasive, at least
to me, in instances in which it is alleged that the school board did not act with
fairness and decency or that the school board had ulterior motives in not
renewing the teacher's contract."
Id. (quoting Fercho v. Montpelier Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 14, 312 N.W.2d 337, 342 (N.D. 1981)
(VandeWalle, J., concurring specially)). Justice VandeWalle, although refusing to second-
guess the fact finder, believed that there was minimal, if any, effort to arrange coaching
responsibilities so that Kent, in this case, could have had:
an opportunity to apply for the vacant position for which she was otherwise qual-
ified. That should be the primary concern of all school boards when releasing
veteran teachers because of declining budget deficits. Anything less opens the
school board's determination to nonrenew a veteran, and presumably more
highly paid teacher to allegations of ulterior motives.
Id.
Justice Levine, in concurrence, agreed with Justice VandeWalle in expressing concern
over the school board's "cavalier disregard" of its obligation to rehire the plaintiff, which
was evidenced by its failure to make accommodations for the plaintiff in filling the vacant
position by merely rearranging coaching responsibilities. Id. at 291-92.
713. 492 N.W.2d 604 (N.D. 1992).
714. Hulse v. Job Serv. North Dakota, 492 N.W.2d 604 (N.D. 1992).
715. Id.
716. Id. at 605.
717. Id.
718. Id. The expletive was "[w]hat a waste of human sperm!" Id.
719. Hulse, 492 N.W.2d at 605.
720. Id.
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Eventually, Hulse was given the option to resign or be termi-
nated because of the incident.72 1 Hulse chose to resign and
applied for job insurance benefits.7 2 A claims deputy denied ben-
efits to Hulse, asserting Hulse was discharged for reasons constitut-
ing "misconduct. '723 A Job Service appeals referee reversed the
claims deputy's determination, concluding that the remark was
isolated, and therefore should be considered an act of negligence
rather than benefit-disqualifying misconduct. 724 The Boys Ranch
appealed to the executive director of Job Service, who reversed
the referee's decision on the basis that the expletive was miscon-
duct.7 25 Hulse appealed to the district court, which affirmed the
executive director's decision.726
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that if facts and cir-
cumstances in an individual case require it, one incident of poor
judgment may constitute benefit-disqualifying misconduct.727
Here, the court would find misconduct and deny Hulse benefits if
the circumstances indicated that Hulse's slip-of-the-tongue fell
into any of the following four categories: (1) the conduct was made
in willful or wanton disregard of his employer's interests; or (2) the
remark was so careless or negligent so that it constituted disregard
of his employer's interests; or (3) he made the remark with
"wrongful intent or evil design;" or (4) he "intentionally and sub-
stantially disregarded [his employer's] interests or his own duties
and obligations. ' 728  The supreme court held that unless the evi-
721. Id.
722. Id.
723. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-06-02(2X1991). Section 52-06-02(2) of the North
Dakota Century Code provides that an individual who has been discharged for misconduct
in connection with his or her employment is disqualified from receiving unemployment
compensations benefits. Hulse, 492 N.W.2d at 606.
724. Hulse, 492 N.W.2d at 605.
725. Id.
726. Id. at 606.
727. Id. at 608. Although the term "misconduct" is not statutorily defined, a definition
of misconduct for purposes of section 52-06-02(2) has been maintained by North Dakota
courts for nearly a decade and is defined as:
[C]onduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests as
is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the
employer has the right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or
negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability,
wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial
disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations
to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct,
failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity,
inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors
in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed 'misconduct' within the meaning
of the statutes."
Id. at 606 (quoting Perske v. Job Serv. of North Dakota, 336 N.W.2d 146, 148-49 (N.D.
1983)).
728. Id. at 608. The supreme court noted that since disqualifying provisions are
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dence of culpability was able to fit one of the four categories, one
moment of poor judgment would not be categorized as miscon-
duct.729 The supreme court found Hulse's behavior did not rise to
any of the criteria of culpability specified in the definition of
misconduct.730
The supreme court reversed the agency's decision and the dis-
trict court's judgment affirming the denial of benefits, and
remanded to Job Service.73 '
VENDOR AND PURCHASER
United Bank of Bismarck v. Trout
In United Bank of Bismarck v. Trout,7 32 United Bank brought
an eviction action against a purchaser's lessees, the Trouts.733
The Trouts lost a mortgage foreclosure action against United
Bank, and in April 1990, the bank obtained a sheriff's deed to the
land, which consisted of 212 acres in rural Burleigh County.734
When the Trouts and the bank failed to reach a lease agreement,
the bank listed the property for sale.7 35 A friend of the Trouts,
Dennis Collins, negotiated with the bank to purchase the prop-
erty.736 The agreement between the bank and Collins required
Collins to pay $46,500 as earnest money.737 In October 1990, Col-
lins paid $30,000 of the earnest money.738  The bank signed the
purchase agreement, but made a notation of conditional accept-
exceptions to the state's remedial unemployment compensation laws, courts should
generally construe them strictly or narrowly. Id. at 607. The court indicated that the
primary objective of the compensation laws, "'soften[ing] the harsh impact of involuntary
unemployment,'" must be "tempered by a competing objective, declared at section 52-06-
02, of protecting employers 'from quits that have nothing to do with the employer or the
employment,' and from dismissals based upon employee 'misconduct.'" Id. The court
stated that the objectives should be construed together to mean "that an employee should
be disqualified for misconduct only when the facts and circumstances of a case 'come within
the clear meaning of the words used in the provisions' of section 52-06-02, and,
consequently, within the clear meaning of the language contained in our definition of
misconduct." Id. at 607-08 (citation omitted).
729. Hulse, 492 N.W.2d at 608.
730. Id.
731. Id. at 609. Chief Justice Erickstad concurred specially in order to ensure that the
opinion was not misinterpreted to mean that the discharge was not justified. Id. Justice
Erickstad clarified that "although the discharge may have been necessary ..., [the
employee's behavior] was not sufficiently egregious to deprive the frustrated counselor of
his job benefits especially as it was not a part of a series of acts, but was only a onetime
occurrence." Id.
732. 480 N.W.2d 742 (N.D. 1992).
733. United Bank of Bismarck v. Trout, 480 N.W.2d 742, 743 (N.D. 1992).
734. Id.
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Id.
738. United Bank, 480 N.W.2d at 743.
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ance of the agreement upon receipt of the remaining amount
due.739 Collins then leased the property to the Trouts for $100 a
month.74 °
By January 1991, Collins had not tendered the remaining
money due to the bank.741 The bank declared that the $30,000
was a forfeiture and brought an eviction action against the
Trouts.742 The county court determined that Collins had no title
and no interest to lease to the Trouts.743 The Trouts appealed,
claiming that the county court had no jurisdiction, that Collins was
an indispensable party, that Collins acquired the title through
equitable conversion, that the bank was required to foreclose
through judicial proceedings, and that the bank wrongfully
declared a forfeiture of the $30,000.44
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the county
court had original jurisdiction over eviction actions and, therefore,
had incidental authority to determine title to the property. 45
Since the county court decided only the issue inherent in the evic-
tion action itself, the court found that the county court had not
acted in excess of its jurisdiction. 4 6
The court stated that because an eviction is a possessory
action, the person in actual possession is the necessary party.7 47
Since Collins was not in actual possession, he was neither a neces-
sary nor an indispensable party; therefore, the county court did
not err by failing to require Collins joined as a defendant. 748
Trouts' next argument was that Collins acquired title to the
property through equitable conversion since the purchase agree-
ment was a binding executory contract for sale.749 The equitable
conversion, it was argued, gave Collins equitable title and the
bank legal title.750 The supreme court disagreed, finding that
under the express terms of the agreement "payment of the
agreed-upon earnest money was a condition precedent to forma-
tion of an enforceable agreement to sell the property."751 Because
739. Id.
740. Id.
741. Id.
742. Id.
743. United Bank, 480 N.W.2d at 743.
744. Id. at 743-44.
745. Id. at 745.
746. Id. at 746.
747. Id. at 747.
748. United Bank, 480 N.W.2d at 747.
749. Id. at 747-48.
750. Id. at 748.
751. Id.
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Collins did not fulfill his obligation, the condition precedent failed
and the agreement did not become binding.75 2 Thus, the bank did
not have an enforceable executory contract for sale, Collins did
not have title to the property, and "equitable conversion [did] not
apply."7 5
3
The court thus negated the Trouts' claim of the existence of
an enforceable contract which required the bank to foreclose or
cancel the purchase agreement judicially before seeking eviction;
since there was no enforceable contract, there was nothing to fore-
close or cancel. 5
Finally, the Trouts argued that the bank could not retain the
$30,000 as forfeited damages. 755 They claimed that the bank
could not rely upon the forfeiture provisions of the earnest money
agreement while claiming that the agreement was not binding.75 6
However, the supreme court stated that Collins, not the Trouts,
was the proper party to assert a claim of wrongful forfeiture.75 7
Further, the Trouts' rights to possession of the property was
entwined with the issue of whether the bank had wrongfully for-
feited Collins' earnest money.758 Therefore, the bank's retention
of the $30,000 did not constitute reversible error.759
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the county
court.76 o
752. Id.
753. United Bank, 480 N.W.2d at 748.
754. Id. at 748-49.
755. Id. at 749.
756. Id.
757. Id.
758. United Bank, 480 N.W.2d at 749.
759. Id.
760. Id. Justice VandeWalle concurred specially, expressing his concern with the
majority's view that issues of title may be properly decided in a summary proceeding such
as an eviction action. Id. Justice VandeWalle disagreed with the majority's statement that
the legislature, not the court, was the proper forum in which to argue that a title issue is not
fairly tried in a summary proceeding. Id. Noting that, title issues often involve
"complicated factual and legal questions," VandeWalle stated, "I do not, however, concede
that this court is powerless to impose a different procedure should justice in the form of
procedural due process so require." Id.
Justice Meschke dissented, opining that an enforceable agreement between Collins and
the bank was created when the bank accepted Collins' partial payment. Id. at 750-51.
Meschke stated further that "actual possession of land by a tenant is constructive notice of
the landlord's rights" and argued that because the bank knew that Collins had rented the
land to the Trouts, the bank had acceded Collins' rights in the land. Id. at 751. Justice
Meschke concluded that the county court "legally erred" when it failed to provide Collins
or the Trouts the opportunity to either pay the balance owed the bank or redeem the land.
Id.
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WILILS-EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
Stratton v. Rose
In Stratton v. Rose,76 ' the personal representative of an estate
appealed from a county court order approving a final accounting
and distribution.76 2 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that
the county court abused its discretion and reversed and
remanded.76 3
Richard Rose was the personal representative of the estate of
Hilman Hofland 7 4 When Hofland died in 1985, he lived in Wash-
ington state.765 He owned property located in Washington and
Bottineau County in North Dakota.766 Hofland's will and codicil
were probated in Washington, and Rose was appointed the per-
sonal representative.76 7 Rose fied an authenticated copy of his
appointment with the Bottineau County Court.768 The court
issued a "Letters Testamentary," which indicated that Hofland's
will was admitted to informal probate and that Rose was the per-
sonal representative in North Dakota.769
Subsequently, Larry Stratton filed an action against Rose in
the Bottineau County Court.77° Stratton alleged that Hofland
intended to leave him a particular piece of land in Bottineau
County and that the land was erroneously described in the codi-
cil.771 Dan Hofland and several other cross-claimants intervened,
claiming mineral interests in *a portion of the same land. 72
All the parties agreed to stipulations which resolved the will
dispute.773 In February 1990, the cross-claimants and three of the
defendants made a motion for an inventory and accounting
regarding the North Dakota mineral interests and proceeds from
the interests since Hofland's death in the Bottineau County
Court.774 Rose also claimed the interests had been distributed and
that the North Dakota ancillary proceedings were complete.7
761. 484 N.W.2d 274 (N.D. 1992).
762. Stratton v. Rose, 484 N.W.2d 274 (N.D. 1992).
763. Id. at 280.
764. id. at 274.
765. Id.
766. Id.
767. Stratton, 484 N.W.2d at 274.
768. Id.
769. Id. at 274, 277.
770. Id. at 274.
771. Id. at 274-75.
772. Stratton, 484 N.W.2d at 275.
773. Id.
774. Id.
775. Id.
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Rose stated that the mineral interest proceeds would be distrib-
uted after a hearing for a final counting and distribution, which
was scheduled to take place in Washington in April 1990.776
An accountant prepared a final accounting and distribution of
the proceeds from the North Dakota property for the cross-claim-
ants.777 The cross-claimants moved for approval of the account-
ing.771 Rose objected, arguing that the Washington court should
determine those issues.779 The Bottineau County Court denied
the motion for approval. 78 0
Subsequently, the cross-claimants and additional defendants
agreed to an accounting and distribution.7 1' They made a motion
for an order approving the accounting in Bottineau County
Court.78 2 They also asked for an order to direct Rose to deliver the
property pursuant to the agreement.78 3 Once again, Rose opposed
the motion on the grounds that the Washington court should
decide the final counting and distribution of the entire estate.7 4
Rose argued that in the alternative, a North Dakota approval of
the accounting and distribution should be done after formal pro-
ceedings, allowing all necessary parties to appear. 78 - The Bot-
tineau County Court approved the final accounting and
distribution.78 6 Rose appealed.787
Rose argued that although the Bottineau County Court had
jurisdiction, it should not have exercised that jurisdiction.78 Rose
further contended that the court should not have approved the
accounting and distribution because those same issues were pend-
ing in a Washington court.789 Rose also claimed the Uniform Pro-
bate Code (U.P.C.) provides that the administration of multiple-
state estates should take place in the decedent's domicile.7 90 The
cross-complainants claimed the U.P.C. policy did not apply
because North Dakota settlement agreements, distribution of pro-
776. Id.
777. Stratton, 484 N.W.2d at 275.
778. Id.
779. Id.
780. Id.
781. Id.
782. Stratton, 484 N.W.2d at 275.
783. Id.
784. Id.
785. Id.
786. Id.
787. Stratton, 484 N.W.2d at 275.
788. Id.
789. Id.
790. Id. The Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C.) was adopted in North Dakota in 1973. Id.
at 275 n.1.
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ceeds, and property were involved.7 9 '
Rose also argued that there was no local administration of the
estate.792 The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed.793 The
county court's action of issuing the "Letters Testamentary" com-
menced local administration of the estate.7 94 Additionally, Strat-
ton's action against Rose and his motion for a final accounting and
distribution also constituted local administration of the estate.7 95
The supreme court noted that under the U.P.C., a general
rule for a nonresident decedent's estate is that a local personal rep-
resentative should deliver a local estate to the domiciliary personal
representative for the benefit of the successors.79 6 The court
noted that the rule furthers "the purpose of coercing respect for
domiciliary procedures and unifying administration of multiple-
state estates. '797 The cross-claimants argued that they fit under
the statutory exceptions to the general rule because successors to
the North Dakota property were identified by the parties' stipula-
tions.798 The cross-claimants also claimed that if an interested
party petitions for a closing, a court may order local distribu-
tion.799 The supreme court found that Rose had already conveyed
the surface and mineral rights under the parties' stipulations.800
The remaining dispute was the distribution of the proceeds
between the date of Hofland's death and the effective date of the
stipulations under local law.10' Rose argued those proceeds were
located in Washington. 80 2
The supreme court found that when the Bottineau County
Court approved the final accounting and distribution, it did not
explain why it chose not to defer to the domiciliary administration
of the estate. 0 3 The supreme court stated that the Bottineau
County Court "ignored the significance of domicile and domicili-
ary proceedings under the U.P.C. ' ' 80 4 In doing so, the Bottineau
County Court abused its discretion.80 5
791. Id.
792. Stratton, 484 N.W.2d at 277.
793. Id.
794. Id.
795. Id.
796. Id. at 278. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-19-16.
797. Stratton, 484 N.W.2d at 278.
798. Id.
799. Id.
800. Id.
801. Id.
802. Stratton, 484 N.W.2d at 278.
803. Id. at 280.
804. Id.
805. Id.
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The supreme court reversed and remanded to the county
court for consideration of laws applicable to the proceeds, defer-
ence to the domiciliary jurisdiction, and any possible claims
against the estate.80 6
WILLS-TESTAMENTARY INTENT
Ostby v. Bisek (In re Estate of Ostby)
In Ostby v. Bisek (Matter of Estate of Ostby),8 0 7 the North
Dakota Supreme Court considered a personal representative's
appeal from a judgment declaring that the will of the decedent,
Gilbert Ostby, was not validly executed.808 Dean Ostby, Gilbert's
personal representative and nephew, argued that the trial court
did not apply the correct law, the evidence did not disprove testa-
mentary intent, and the trial court made erroneous findings of
undue influence.80 9 The supreme court agreed and reversed the
lower court's ruling.
Gilbert Ostby, who was ill, asked Dean Ostby to help him pre-
pare a will.81 0 Dean agreed and wrote down Gilbert's wishes as he
dictated them to him.8 1' Dean delivered the notes to an attorney,
who then prepared a proposed will and a power of attorney for
Gilbert.812 The completed will was read by Dean to the decedent
who then executed it. The will was witnessed and notarized.8 13
The trial court held that the decedent lacked the testamen-
tary capacity to create the will because "Gilbert 'did not know
what he was signing' and 'did not know the contents'" of the doc-
ument.8 4 The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, held that
the trial court's findings were based on an erroneous view of the
law of testamentary intent.8 1 5 The supreme court noted that the
burden to prove a lack of testamentary intent is on the contestant,
and the evidence was insufficient to support such a finding.
81 6
806. Id.
807. 479 N.W.2d 866 (N.D. 1992).
808. In re Ostby, 479 N.W.2d 866 (N.D. 1992).
809. Id. at 869.
810. Id. at 868.
811. Id.
812. Id.
813. In re Ostby, 479 N.W.2d at 868 (N.D. 1992). The decedent indicated his approval
with the will by responding "okay" to each clause of the will which was read to him. Id.
Additionally, the same day that the decedent executed the will, his treating physician
examined him and found him to be" 'mentally competent in a testamentary capacity.'" Id.
814. Id at 869. Essentially, the contestant argued that the decedent's lack of
knowledge of the will is due to the fact that Dean read only the "dispositive" clauses and
the titled sections of the will and not the technical phrases. Id.
815. In re Ostby, 479 N.W. 2d at 869 (N.D. 1992).
816. Id. at 871.
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Additionally, the court opined that it is not necessary for a testator
to understand every component and technical phrase of a will if
the instrument is intended as a will and it expresses the testator's
intent.81 7 The court determined that Gilbert's will, prepared with
the help of his attorney, expressed his testamentary intent even
though he did not comprehend every clause in it.81 8
The trial court also held that the will was invalid because of
the presence of undue influence. 819 However, the North Dakota
Supreme Court again stated that the trial court's determination
was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law because the
trial court wrongly shifted the burden of persuasion on to the pro-
ponent.8 20 Due to the trial court's erroneous findings, the North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 2
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Grotte v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau
In Grotte v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau,822
Timothy Grotte appealed from a judgment of the district court
affirming the Workers' Compensation Bureau's (Bureau) dismissal
of Grotte's claim because it was untimely filed.823
Grotte began working as a field technician for Phillips Petro-
leum Company (Phillips) in October, 1985.824 In June 1987, he
was hospitalized with pneumonia with pleurisy.825 His lung condi-
tion improved until he began working again.8 26 In November
1987, Grotte's doctor told him the lung condition was a result of
the chemical fumes present in Grotte's workplace.827 Grotte con-
tinued working at Phillips, periodically taking necessary sick leave
until he was laid off in July 1988.828 He filed a claim for benefits
817. Id. at 870.
818. Id.
819. Id. at 869.
820. In re Ostby, 479 N.W. 2d at 872 (N.D. 1992). The court noted that it has rejected,
numerous times, "the notion that there is any presumption of undue influence arising from
the existence of the decedent's power of attorney to a helpful beneficiary, or from a
confidential relationship with the decedent of a helpful beneficiary." Id. at 871 (citations
omitted).
821. Id. at 872.
822. 489 N.W.2d 875 (N.D. 1992).
823. Grotte v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 489 N.W.2d 875 (N.D.
1992).
824. Id.
825. Id.
826. Id.
827. Id. Grotte's employment required that he work around chemicals which were
irritating his lungs. Id
828. Grotte, 489 N.W.2d at 875. Grotte's condition would improve when he removed
himself from the work environment. Id.
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relating to his lung condition with the Bureau in May 1989.129 The
Bureau denied the claim on the ground that it was untimely
filed, 30 and the district court affirmed the Bureau's dismissal.8 3'
The Bureau had determined Grotte's one-year period of limi-
tation began running in November 1987, when Grotte knew or
should have known he had a compensable injury. 3 2  Grotte
argued that the Bureau had not made a specific finding of fact that
he knew or should have known of the injury's cause in November
1987.83
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that although the
Bureau's finding did not specifically mention the word "compensa-
ble," Grotte knew or should have known his lung condition was
caused by the chemicals at Phillips. 34 Grotte himself stated in his
testimony that his doctor informed him that his condition was
work-related in November 1987.835
Grotte also argued his employer discouraged him from filing a
claim, and therefore the Bureau should be estopped from denying
his claim.8 36  Grotte claimed his supervisor told him Phillips'
829. Id. at 876.
830. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-01 (1991) (requiring that an injured worker file
for workers' compensation benefits "within one year [of the date] a reasonable person knew
or should have known that the injury was related to employment"). As such, section 65-05-
01 requires knowledge of the compensable injury in order to begin the period for the filing
of a claim. Id.
831. Grotte, 489 N.W.2d at 876.
832. Id.
833. Id.
834. Id.
835. Id. at 877. Grotte's testimony clearly revealed that he knew or had reason to
know that he had a compensable work related injury:
"I had bronchitis, asthma, and a burning sensation in the lungs, especially when I
was close to any chemical fumes or large amounts of hydrogen sulfide gas at
work. Hydrogen sulfide gas, corrosion chemicals, and just the smell of the oil
itself was irritating me whenever I got around large amounts.
"[W]henever my respiratory problem flared up, I always kept in close contact
with my physician and he related that the respiratory problems were the -
(inaudible.)
"MR. HAAS: That they were related to your work?
"THE WITNESS: Yes, Sir.
"Q. When did he first relate this to you?
"A. He suspected probably, I would say, probably in July or August of 1987, and
then on a visit with him in November of 1987 he definitely stated that it was
work related. And it is documented in my medical records."
Id.
836. Grotte, 489 N.W.2d at 877. The Bureau responded to the claimant's assertions by
contending that "an employer's conduct, however egregious, cannot constitute grounds to
estop the Bureau from asserting the statute of limitations under Section 65-05-01,
N.D.C.C." Id. The Bureau found that Grotte was not discouraged from filing a
compensation claim; consequently, the supreme court did "not determine whether or not
an employer's wrongful conduct, which prevents an employee from filing a timely claim,
can estop the Bureau from asserting that the claim was untimely filed ...[,]" since the court
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health insurance and sick leave were adequate and that Grotte did
not need to file a workers' compensation claim. 37 Grotte's super-
visor denied that he discouraged Grotte from filing a claim in testi-
mony to the Bureau.8 38  The supreme court stated it was the
Bureau's responsibility to assess credibility of witnesses and to
weigh evidence, and Grotte's estoppel argument lacked merit.839
The supreme court affirmed the Bureau and district court dis-
missal of Grotte's claim.8 40
Holtz v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau
In Holtz v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau,84 '
the North Dakota Supreme Court considered whether a person
may collect benefits for nonwork-related injuries that occur after a
work-related injury and are not causally connected to the work-
related injury. 42
In August of 1989, Carol Holtz left her employment because
she had contracted dermatitis.8 13 Although Holtz was initially
granted temporary total disability benefits, the Workers Compen-
sation Bureau later denied vocational and rehabilitation benefits
because it determined that Holtz had transferable skills which
allowed her to return to work. 44 The Bureau also determined
that Holtz's current disability was "'unrelated to her work
injury.' "845 The Bureau's decision was affirmed by the district
court.8 4 6
On appeal, Holtz argued that after she quit her job, she suf-
fered additional injuries which created physical limitations on her
ability to gain employment. 47 Holtz contended that the physical
limitations suffered as a result of her nonwork-related injuries
concluded that the Bureau's finding was supported by the preponderance of the evidence.
Id. at 877-78.
837. Id. at 878.
838. Grotte, 489 N.W.2d at 878.
839. Id. at 878-79.
840. Id. at 882. Justices Meschke and Levine, writing separately in dissent, argued that
because Grotte received payment from his employer when he missed work due to his lung
condition, an equitable tolling of the one-year period of limitations would be appropriate.
Id. at 880, 882-85. The majority noted that the issue of equitable tolling was not raised by
Grotte. Id. Moreover, the majority asserted that this case was not an appropriate one to toll
the claim period on the basis of public policy or equity "because any reasonable tolling of
the limitation period would not change the result." Id. at 881.
841. 479 N.W.2d 469 (N.D. 1992).
842. Holtz v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 479 N.W.2d 469, 469-70
(N.D. 1992).
843. Id. at 469.
844. Id.
845. Id.
846. Id.
847. Holtz, 479 N.W.2d at 470. A week after Holtz quit her job, she fell and fractured
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should have been considered by the Bureau when it reviewed her
eligibility for disability and rehabilitation benefits.8 4 Holtz relied
on section 65-05.1-01(3) of the North Dakota Century Code to sup-
port her position alleging that the term "'medical limitations' [as
contained in the statute] requires that all of an injured employee's
medical limitations are relevant to a decision about eligibility.-8 49
The court examined the language and content of the statute
and determined that both "medical limitations" and "injury" are
criteria which must be considered in determining what type of
employment is available to a claimant.85 0 In reading the two crite-
ria together the court determined that "the intent of the legisla-
ture [in creating section 65-05.1-01(3)] was for the Bureau to
consider an individual's medical limitations at the time that indi-
vidual sustained a work-related injury."-8 5 1 The court examined
various statutes dealing with compensable injury and determined
that in aggregate, the statutes indicated "that it is work-related
injury that is at the center of the legislature's attention."8 5 2 The
court noted that the workers' compensation laws evidence the
"proposition that an injury must be work-related, that is, within
the course of employment .... "853 Finally, the court noted that
since Holtz did not claim that her disability was related to her
employment as a beautician or that her work-related dermatitis
was a " 'substantial contributing factor' to any alleged disability,
... the Bureau need not consider any medical limitations Holtz
suffers from subsequent nonwork-related injuries. '"854
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. 855
her elbow, which required surgery. Soon thereafter, she suffered a serious whiplash injury
when involved in an automobile collision. Id.
848. Id.
849. Id.
850. Id.
851. Id. at 470-71.
852. Holtz, 479 N.W.2d at 471. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-01-02(8), 65-02-02(2), 65-
05-05.
853. Holtz, 479 N.W.2d at 471.
854. Id.
855. Id.
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